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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“For those engaged in the practice of the law there is no more valuable book than a good 
law dictionary or lexicon. It is indeed an indispensable part of the equipment of every 
lawyer’s library.”1 
 
 
Words, words, words 
 
Lawyers: the language priests 
All legal concepts must be formulated in words. The link between law and language is 
thus intimate and rightfully the subject of study in its own right. But beyond ordinary 
language there is also legal jargon.2 The law is full of jargon: so full, indeed, that the 
layman can be so bamboozled by the language of the law as to find it practically 
unintelligible. Lawyers, it seems, don’t mean what they say, a point some lawyers admit: 
it would be “positively dangerous”, a leading writer on statutory interpretation has 
written, for lay people to attempt to read the law without expert assistance.3 That the law 
appears to be couched in a foreign language, a language only the initiated can decipher, 
may be one of the reasons for the general dislike of lawyers.  
 
Access to the Word 
The popular vilification of lawyers, it is interesting to observe, perhaps predominates in 
countries whose laws are uncodified and whose histories are tied to the reformed 
Christian tradition. Unlike access to the word of God, access to the law, particularly the 
                                                 
1 H Goudy, “Review of Wharton’s Law-Lexicon, 8th edn” (1889) 1 JR 320. 
2 George Orwell’s classic essay, “Politics and the English language” (see e.g. B Crick (ed), George Orwell: 
Essays (1994) 348) gains rather than loses force with age. Orwell’s enduring themes have been regularly 
discussed in the journalism of Robert Fisk: see R Fisk, The Age of the Warrior: Selected Writings (2008) ch 
3: “Words, Words, Words”. 
3 F A R Bennion, “Don’t put the law into public hands” The Times, 24 Jan 1995. Bennion is the author of 
the standard work, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation: a Code (5th edn, 2007). 
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law in a non-codified legal system, requires the intervention of an intermediary, the 
lawyer: the inability of the layman to access unaccompanied the content of the law he is 
expected to obey is rather at odds with the tide of social, political and ecclesiastical 
history of the Reformation. The law of Rome, as developed in the learned laws of the ius 
commune, could be seen as a weapon of the ruling classes, who alone had access to out-
of-the-way literature written in foreign languages.4   
In uncodified systems, particularly in a small system like Scotland, accessibility is a 
major problem. Just as many rules are found in legal doctrine as in an Act of Parliament 
or a decided case. To find a concise statement of what the law actually is may require 
considerable expertise, time, and a good library. And even with all of these, the 
professional lawyer (to say nothing of the non-lawyer) may never find a statement of the 
law, for the simple reason that there is no authoritative statement. All too often, decided 
cases – a standard source in a non-codified system – deal with unusual situations. The 
basics are thus often neglected. “It is said this point has never been decided,” one of the 
more enigmatic characters on the Scottish bench in the eighteenth century, James Burnet, 
Lord Monboddo, once observed, adding the important insight that: “Points never decided 
are the strongest and most certain in our law”.5 The “law as self-understood” point has 
been picked up by English judges,6 and is one that can be traced throughout legal 
history.7   
 
Accessibility 
                                                 
4 T M Lindsay, A History of the Reformation, vol I: In Germany (2nd edn, 1909) 107-08. Lindsay makes 
this point for much of Northern Europe, not just for Scotland; and more concisely and more accurately 
than, for example, A Wightman’s interesting, though polemical, The Poor had no Lawyers: Who Owns 
Scotland? (2010). 
5 M’Donnells v Carmichael (1773) Mor 4974, Hailes 513 at 514. Cf Johnston v O’Neill [1911] AC 552 at 
592-3 per Lord Dunedin. 
6 For similar statements by English judges, see Butt v Conant (1820) 1 Broderip and Bingham 548 at 566, 
129 ER 834 at 842 per Dallas CJ; Panama and South Pacific Telegraph Company v India Rubber, Gutta 
Percha, and Telegraph Works Company (1875) 10 Ch App 515 at 526 per James LJ. James LJ was a 
Glasgow graduate. 
7 D Daube, “The self-understood in legal history” (1973) JR 126; in German at (1973) 90 ZSS (RA) 1, and 
republished in the United States at (1999) 2 Green Bag (2d) 413.  Daube’s article had a clear, if 
unattributed, influence on the speech of his doctoral student, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, in A v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 AC 221 at para 129. 
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“It has been asserted, that for the law to be known,” Samuel Johnson wrote in the preface 
to his own Dictionary, “is of more importance than to be right.”8  Johnson may here be 
referring to Kames who wrote that “it is of great importance, that there be a fixed rule 
publickly known, but of very little importance what that rule be”.9  Codification of the 
unwritten law in the vernacular, it might be suggested, offers at least the perception of 
certainty and accessibility.10 But while certainty is a virtue it is, for law, not the only 
virtue; and, in this case as in others, injustice is rarely ameliorated by inexorability.  
Codes, in practice, may be no more likely to ensure legal certainty than the unsystematic 
assortment of legislation, cases and general principles found in Scotland.11   
But a code does provide a much greater degree of accessibility – a basic starting-point 
– for lawyers and laypeople alike. The Roman Twelve Tables, Lord Halsbury recalled, 
were originally drawn up because the Plebeians did not know the unwritten law.12 A 
similar movement is seen in the statements of customary law written between the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in France, and in the moves to codification 
throughout Europe from the second half of the eighteenth. A major advantage of a code is 
its systematic structure. This provides what a dictionary cannot, although, even in a 
codified system, a law dictionary for the jargon of the law is still desirable.13   
Assuming, however, that one can access the law, the next difficulty is to understand it. 
Latin and French have both been languages of Scots law,14 though neither would have 
been much spoken, while Gaelic has been much spoken, although less used for legal 
purposes if the meagre surviving documentary evidence is anything to go by.15 Latin, 
                                                 
8 S Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (1755), preface. Johnson’s Dictionary was reviewed by 
Adam Smith in the original Edinburgh Review: (1755) 1 Edinburgh Review 61 (reproduced in Adam 
Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed W P D Wightman and J C Bryce (Glasgow Edition of the 
Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith vol III, 1982)). 
9 H Home, Lord Kames, The Decisions of the Court of Session from Its first Institution to the present Time. 
Abridged, and Digested under proper Heads, in Form of a Dictionary vol 1 (1741) ii. 
10 Cf M D Chalmers, “Wanted – a law dictionary” (1892) 8 LQR 283 at 285-6. 
11 Cf B Levi, Freedom and the Law (3rd edn, 1991). 
12 See the 1st edition of Halsbury’s Laws of England (1907-17), undated preface. 
13 See the German examples in nn 215-20 below.  
14 H L MacQueen’s illuminating paper, “Laws and languages: some historical notes from Scotland” (2002) 
6.2 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (Ius Commune Lectures on Private Law 5), gives the example 
of the Leges inter Brettos et Scotos (APS I, 663) drafted in Latin, French and Scots. The oldest version is 
the French, found in the Berne MS – the oldest Scots law manuscript – which has been dated to c 1270. The 
Latin version makes it into Regiam Majestatem. 
15 See MacQueen (n 14) 12; R Black, “A Gaelic contract of lease, c 1603 x 1616”, in W D H Sellar (ed), 
Miscellany II (Stair Society vol 35, 1982) 132. 
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Scots and English have been the main languages of Scots law and all continue to be used, 
whether in oft-repeated maxims or in the daily language of our courts: the “growing use 
in practice of the common tongue,” Hector MacQueen has written, “never amounted to a 
monopoly; Latin maintained a place in the law alongside, first, Scots, and then standard 
English, into the twentieth century; and even now, in the twenty-first, like Scots, it has 
not wholly disappeared from the lexicon and vocabulary of the lawyer.”16   
Scots law has produced one of the best17 collections for understanding Latin maxims 
as well as one reputed to be among the worst.18 But there are many terms of jargon which 
are perhaps more likely to be misunderstood because, being Scots, they are not in a 
foreign language. And here the book reproduced in these pages, Bell’s Dictionary and 
Digest of the Law of Scotland, performs a valuable role. Many words of Scottish legal 
vocabulary are no longer in daily use,19 though the underlying concepts may be similar to 
those in other European civil law systems which also developed, in their native 
vernacular, colourful ways of expressing ideas.20 Armed with the wherewithal to 
understand the terms of art, however, native terminology no longer intimidates: indeed, it 
often crisply expresses a legal idea better than any soulless modern regulatory 
formulation ever could. And, once understood, native vocabulary is not easily forgotten. 
This introduction seeks to trace the evolution of Bell’s Dictionary for the reader who 
might be opening it for the first time. An attempt will be made to place the work in 
context, and to consider its utility for the present. No doubt an attempt could be made to 
compile a dictionary of law dictionaries, but this is not it. The following is not 
comprehensive. A readable, entertaining and thoroughly learned account has been given 
of some of the more out-of-the-way literature by David Murray, in a volume that ought to 
be much more widely read, and which this introduction cannot hope to emulate.21   
                                                 
16 MacQueen (n 14) 16. 
17 Lord Trayner, Latin Maxims and Phrases (4th edn, 1894). 
18 P Halkerston, A Collection of Latin Maxims & Rules, in Law and Equity (1823), discussed below. 
19 One useful online resource is the Dictionary of the Scots Language (www.dsl.ac.uk), which encompasses 
a number of prior collections. Although DSL contains many legal terms, the coverage is not exhaustive.  
20 E Graf and M Dietherr, Deutsche Rechtssprichwörter (2nd edn by J C Bluntschli and K Maurer, 1869 
repr 1975) contains a wonderful, often colourful, selection of Germanic maxims. Another famous example 
is the maxims of equity collected in J McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (32nd edn, 2010). For a hostile critique, 
however, on the utility of a book like Snell for modern English law, see W Swadling (2011) 127 LQR 638. 
21 D Murray, Lawyers’ Merriments (1912). There is no modern biography of Murray, one of the founding 
partners of Maclay Murray & Spens LLP; but see S W Murray, David Murray: A Bibliographical Memoir 
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Scots legal language 
 
A difficulty for any legal dictionary is that the language of law may evolve more rapidly 
than the law itself. Dr Johnson wrote in the preface to his Dictionary that:22 
 
When we see men grow old and die at a certain time one after another, from century to 
century, we laugh at the elixir that promises to prolong life to a thousand years; and with equal 
justice may the lexicographer be derided, who being able to produce no example of a nation 
that has preserved their words and phrases from mutability, shall imagine that his dictionary 
can embalm his language, and secure it from corruption and decay, that it is in his power to 
change sublunary nature, or clear the world at once from folly, vanity, and affectation. 
 
The point seems particularly true of Scots law. For those who speak that law as a mother 
tongue it is easy to forget how impenetrable its language may appear to the uninitiated. 
All Scots lawyers once spoke, at least to an attenuated degree, the language of feudalism 
because the entire system of Scottish land law was feudal. Since 28 November 2004, 
however, when feudal tenure was finally put to rest,23 knowledge of feudalism has ceased 
to be necessary and feudal concepts are no longer taught at the Scottish universities. A 
consequence of this merciful omission in the legal curriculum is that the entire 
vocabulary of feudalism is becoming a foreign language. That may not be thought a 
major difficulty – until one tries to read a case about heritable property, decided prior to 
2004, ignoring every word of feudal vocabulary. The result may render the case 
incomprehensible. Feudal abolition was perhaps the most important development in Scots 
law for centuries; but, like codification, it has given rise to a break with the past; it has, at 
a stroke, rendered modern lawyers partly illiterate.   
                                                                                                                                                 
(1933); M S Moss, “Murray, David (1842-1928)”, Oxford DNB (2004). A formidable scholar, and not only 
in law, Murray left his library of some 23,000 items to Glasgow University, together with a number of 
other bequests to support scholarly activity.  
22 Johnson, Dictionary (n 8), preface.  
23 By the coming into force of the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc (Scotland) Act 2000. 
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The same is true of the law of diligence. Despite modern legislation, the principles of 
the law of diligence are in the common law. Yet the time has already arrived where, for 
the younger lawyer, the terms “poinding” and “warrant sale” look anachronistic. It is here 
that Bell’s Dictionary becomes so useful: it provides a key for today’s lawyers to unlock 
the impenetrable vocabulary of yesteryear in their search for the answers to the legal 
problems of tomorrow. In this sense, therefore, the Dictionary is a necessary tool. But it 
is also more than that. As was eloquently pointed out in the debates surrounding the 
abolition of poindings and warrant sales, in “modernising” technical legal terminology, 
we risk impoverishing our native language.24 Attempts to extirpate the national legal 
vernacular may be compared to the approach of the English courts to remove all 
references to Latin in their civil procedure: a step the late Lord Rodger of Earlsferry 
dismissed as “not only patronising but simplistic”.25  
 
 
Before Bell’s Dictionary 
 
Maps and place names 
A law dictionary, in Scots law at least, is for particular words rather than concepts. It is 
neither a map nor a compass. The major navigational aid to Scots law is the institutional 
structure of the student textbook arranged by Gaius and given fame by Justinian:26 Omne 
autem ius quo utimur vel ad personas pertinet vel ad res vel ad actiones (all our law is 
about persons, things and actions),27 and the sub-division of obligations into those arising 
ex contractu, ex delicto, quasi ex contractu and quasi ex delicto.28 Despite the 
shortcomings of the institutional scheme – and there are many – it is a foundational 
structure and one which has had the same abiding influence on Scots law as it has in 
                                                 
24 See the learned article by R A Macpherson, Messenger-at-Arms: “The snash we maun thole” 2000 SLT 
(News) 49.  
25 A F Rodger, “A time for everything under the law: reflections on retrospectivity” (2005) 121 LQR 57 at 
66 n 46. 
26 N Whitty, “The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia and the institutional tradition”, in S Hetherington (ed), 
Halsbury’s Laws of England: Centenary Essays (2007) 203.  
27 Gaius, Inst 1.8. 
28 Gaius, Inst 3.88-91.  
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Continental Europe:29 the structure is, no less, the longitude and latitude for private 
lawyers the world over.   
A dictionary like this, in contrast, is no more than a list of place names. And while 
such a list, compiled by “that most basic of all systems of classification, alphabetical 
order”,30 may provide further references, it offers little by way of principles and nothing 
in the nature of a conceptual structure. The useful and interesting Place Names of 
Arran,31 for instance, is hardly a guide for the day-tripper hoping to traverse the island’s 
craggy ridges. Bell’s Dictionary and Digest is similarly interesting and useful; but, alone, 
it contains nothing of the fundamentals of Scots law: the reader will search in vain for 
entries on such general concepts as “patrimonial right” or “ownership” or “unjustified 
enrichment”. Indeed it may be precisely because of the institutional inheritance and its 
familiar and universal concepts that the law dictionary has never been so necessary or 
important in civil law systems as in those of the Anglo-American tradition. 
So although it is right and proper that mature legal systems should have modern tools 
such as legal dictionaries, such dictionaries are of secondary importance to fundamentals. 
The first-year student who studies Roman law will obtain a better appreciation of the 
structure of Scots law than the student who merely buys this book. The good student of 
Scots law will, of course, do both. 
 
Digest practicks and Dirleton’s Doubts 
In Scotland the history of compiling legal material into alphabetical order is a long one. 
There are a number of examples in collections of “digest” practicks.32 One of those 
collections, about which until recently little was known, is a collection compiled probably 
by one David Chalmers around 1566. Since at least the nineteenth century, it has been 
known under the title of a Dictionary of Scotch Law.33 Then there is Sir John Skene’s 
                                                 
29 Scotland Act 1998 s 126(4). 
30 P Birks, “The foundation of legal rationality in Scotland”, in R Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law 
Tradition in Scotland (1995) 81 at 83. 
31 I A Fraser, The Place Names of Arran (1999). 
32 See generally H McKechnie, “Practicks”, in An Introductory Survey of the Sources and Literature of 
Scots Law (Stair Society vol 1, 1936) 25, distinguishing between “digest” and “decision” practicks. 
33 There is a single extant MS, held at the British Library. I am grateful to Andrew Simpson of Aberdeen 
University for this information. Dr Simpson is working to bring an edition of Chalmers’ Practicks to 
publication. 
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famous De Verborum Significatione published in 1597,34 the first real dictionary of Scots 
law terms and with references drawn mainly from the civil law tradition. Skene’s work 
has been widely referred to in legal writing but appears never to have been acknowledged 
as a source in any modern Scottish case.35 One reason for this, as we will see, is that 
much of Skene’s work was incorporated into Bell’s Dictionary. In any event, by the 
eighteenth century, Walter Ross felt need to lament of Scottish legal literature that “we 
have no glossary, but Mr Skene’s little tract”.36 Ross further refers to Spotiswoode’s 
Notes to Hope’s Minor Practicks where there is mention of a Scots Law Lexicon; but, as 
Ross observes, it was never published.37  
In the seventeenth century there were various unpublished collections of digest 
practicks, arranged alphabetically, that may be considered as prototype legal dictionaries: 
as, for example, the collections compiled by George Achinleck of Balmanno (c 1635)38 
and Alexander Gibson, Lord Durie (c 1642),39 as well as that compiled by Sir Thomas 
Wallace of Craigie (c 1663) and catalogued either as A Digest of Scots Law40 or A 
Repertory of Scots Law.41  Each is arranged in alphabetical order and, for some entries at 
least, contains further references in the mould of Skene’s De Verborum Significatione. 
After Skene, the best-known example of the presentation of Scots law by alphabetical 
arrangement is Some Doubts & Questions in the Law, Especially of Scotland by Sir John 
Nisbet of Dirleton, published posthumously in 1698.42 The “doubts & questions” proved 
sufficiently important to provoke Sir James Steuart of Goodtrees, then Lord Advocate, to 
                                                 
34 For Skene, see J W Cairns, T D Fergus and H L MacQueen, “Legal humanism in Renaissance Scotland” 
(1990) 11 JLH 40 at 44-8; A L Murray, “Sir John Skene and the exchequer”, in Miscellany One (Stair 
Society vol 26, 1971) 125; A L Murray, “Skene, Sir John, of Curriehill c1540-1617”, Oxford DNB (2004). 
Skene’s De Verborum Significatione was republished in the United States in 2006. As we have seen, 
Skene’s entries are largely incorporated in all editions of Bell’s Dictionary and Digest from 1838 onwards. 
35 Interestingly, the only instance in which Skene is cited in court that I have traced is in an English case 
just over a decade after its initial publication: Earl of Shrewsbury v Earl of Rutland (1609) 1 Bulstrode 4, 
80 ER 710 at 713, referring to the entry for “pannagium porcorum”. 
36 W Ross, To the Members of the College of Justice (1782) 15. 
37 Cf R Spotiswoode, Practicks of the Laws of Scotland (1706), for which see J D Ford, Law and Opinion 
in Seventeenth Century Scotland (2007) 182 ff. 
38 GUL Gen 1260: see G Dolezalek, Scotland under Jus Commune: Census of manuscripts of legal 
literature in Scotland, mainly between 1500 and 1660 vol III (Stair Society vol 57, 2010) 313. I refer here 
only to Glasgow University Library MSS but, as can be seen from Dolezalek’s pioneering survey, copies of 
the same works are in other Scottish libraries. 
39 GUL Murray 585: see Dolezalek, Scotland under the Jus Commune (n 38) 336. 
40 GUL Murray 518: see Dolezalek, Scotland under the Jus Commune (n 38) 320. 
41 GUL Murray 631: see Dolezalek, Scotland under the Jus Commune (n 38) 337. 
42 See generally, Ford, Law and Opinion (n 37) 348 ff. 
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write a gloss which was also published posthumously: Dirleton’s Doubts and Questions 
in the Law of Scotland, Resolved and Answered (1715). Due more to its critical analysis 
than its alphabetical arrangement, Dirleton’s Doubts and Stewart’s Answers was a 
considerable success: as was reputedly said of Lord Eldon, the “doubts were … more 
valuable than other men’s certainties”.43 The House of Lords, at least, has paid Dirleton 
the compliment of centennial citation: once in each of twentieth,44 nineteenth,45 and 
eighteenth centuries,46 while, in Scotland, it has been presented to the Second Division as 
an “institutional” authority.47 It was an important source for Erskine and other writers of 
the eighteenth century. 
 
Eighteenth-century examples 
1710 saw the publication by John Dundas of A Summary view of the Feudal Law, with 
the differences of the Scots law from it; together with a Dictionary of the select terms of 
the Scots and English law. Of the 156 pages of this work, 45 are dedicated to the 
dictionary. The dictionary is in plain and simple terms and aimed at the Scottish 
apprentice. It was followed in mid-century by Bankton’s commentary, in book IV of his 
Institute, on a selection of rules found in the final book of the Justinian’s Digest, to which 
the legal dictionary owes so much, de diversis regulis iuris:48    
 
The Emperor Justinian concludes his Digests with a large collection of rules of the old civil 
law. And since, as was observed in the entry to this work, the civil law is the principal source 
of the law of Scotland, it cannot be doubted but many of these are adopted into it; and 
therefore this performance might justly be thought defective, if they were wholly omitted.  
 
                                                 
43 Russell v Beecham [1924] 1 KB 525 at 536 per Scrutton LJ, who adds in a footnote: “Sir John Nisbet of 
Dirleton, King’s Advocate in the time of Charles II, was the author of a law book known as Dirleton’s 
Doubts. Sir James Steuart of Goodtrees, Lord Advocate in the reigns of William and Mary and Queen 
Anne, was the author of another known as Dirleton’s Doubts Resolved. The Doubts hold a higher place 
than the Resolutions.”   
44 Lord Advocate v Earl of Zetland 1920 SC (HL) 1 at 30 per Lord Shaw of Dunfermline. 
45 Lauderdale Peerage Case (1884-85) LR 10 App Cas 692 at 754 per Lord Watson. 
46 Bruce v Bruce (1790) 6 Bro PC 566, 2 ER 1271 at 1272. 
47 Mackie v Mackie 1917 SC 276 at 279. 
48 Andrew McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights (1751-3, repr by 
the Stair Society, vols 41-3, 1993-5) 4.45. 
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During the tenure of John Inglis as Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, intrants were 
privately examined on Justinian’s Institutes, together with the title de diversis regulis 
iuris – with Bankton’s commentary the assigned reading.49 
 
The dictionary tradition in the civil law 
In an early nineteenth-century case, Mordaunt v Innes,50 the question was whether the 
grant of a lease breached a provision of a deed of investiture against “disponere, 
impignorare, vendere seu dilapidare”. What did dilapidare mean in this context? Bell’s 
Dictionary was of no use, since its entries were mainly in English not Latin. Counsel 
therefore turned to the Lexicon juridicum Calvini51 by Johannes Calvinus, Professor at 
Heidelberg, and to many other sources, foreign and native, besides; in the face of this 
“most minute research”, however, the Lord Justice Clerk concluded only that, “To be 
sure, a question of law is not to be decided by lexicographical authorities… nor does it 
appear to me proper to look to the law of England… the only question is, has [the 
draftsman] used the language of the Chancery of Scotland?”.52  
Advocates of the nineteenth century, still literate in Latin, do appear to have had some 
familiarity with other European works of legal lexicography. Even at the end of the 
century one – no doubt maverick and academically-minded – advocate was prepared to 
say that the collections De Verborum Significatione by Brisson,53 Bronchurst54 and 
Cramer,55 together with the commentary on title de diversis regulis  iuris by Godefrois,56 
                                                 
49 Faculty of Advocates, Regulations as to Intrants (1854), Art 4(2) and “list of books”. See further P Stein, 
Regulae Iuris: from juristic rules to legal maxims (1966). 
50 9 March 1819 FC. 
51 The National Library of Scotland has four editions, each published at Geneva, dating respectively from 
1653, 1665, 1670 and 1689. 
52 9 March 1819 FC at 690 and 695 per Lord Justice Clerk Boyle. 
53 Bernabé Brisson, De Verborum quae ad jus pertinent significatione libri XIX (1559), often cited in the 
edition by J G Heineccius (1743). Brisson accompanied the Duke of Anjou, as potential suitor to Queen 
Elizabeth I, on Anjou’s visit to England in 1580, in order to draft the marriage contract that might have 
resulted: see O Descamps, “Brisson, Barnabé”, in P Arabeyre, J L Halpérin and J Krynen (eds), 
Dictionnaire historique des juristes français (XIIe-XXe siècle) (2007) 137-8; see too E Holthöfer, 
“Brissonius (Brisson), Barnabas (Barnabé)”, in M Stolleis (ed), Juristen: Ein biographisches Lexikon 
(2001) 102-04. 
54 E Bronchurst, De regulis iuris (1624). Bronchurst was Professor at Leiden and his collection De regulis 
iuris ran to some 18 editions: see R Feenstra and C J D Waal, Seventeenth Century Leyden Law Professors 
(1975) 18-24, 47-52. 
55 A W Cramer (ed), De verborum significatione tituli Pandectarum et Codicis cum variae lectionis 
apparatu (1811); or his Supplement to Brisson: Supplementi ad Barnabae Brissonii opus de verborum quae 
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“still retain high authority”.57 What is curious about this assertion is both the works 
included as “high authorities”, some of which were not readily available in Scotland, and 
also those that are excluded, such as the commentaries by Donnellus58 and Cujas,59 both 
of which remain available in Scotland even today. But however that may be, the point is 
that in the civil law there is a strong legal dictionary tradition, centred around the Digest 
title de diversis regulis iuris.60   
One final point is worth highlighting. With the growth of legal nationalism at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, and as the European-wide use of Latin gave way to 
the vernacular, Scots law lost sight of European benchmarks for legal dictionaries such as 
those, for example, that were beginning to appear in Germany61 and Italy,62 as well as the 
encyclopaedias that appeared in France.63 Nevertheless, at the end of the nineteenth 
century occasional references, such as to a German encyclopaedia, are encountered.64 
 
The nineteenth century: Halkerston’s Maxims 
                                                                                                                                                 
ad ius civile pertinent significatione (1813). See further H Ratjen (ed), Andreas Wilhelm Cramers Kleine 
Schriften, vol 1 (1837) xiv-xv. 
56 A reference to Denys Godefrois (1549-1622) (Dionysius Gothofredus) whose commentary on the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis, continued by his son Jacques, became the standard edition of the usus modernus, running 
through some 50 editions over 2 centuries, including one by Simon van Leeuwen. They continue to be used 
today. Denys Godefrois was a Calvinist French jurist who was one of the figureheads of the Geneva school 
of legal humanism, and later became professor of law at Heidelberg: see E Holthöfer, “Godefroy 
(Gothofredus), Denis (1549-1622)” and “Godefroy (Gothefredus), Jacques”, in M Stolleis, Juristen (n 53) 
248-50; A Dufour, “Godefroy (Gothofredus) Denys”, in Arabeyre et al, Dictionnaire historique (n 53) 376-
7.   
57 N[eil] J[ohn] D[ownie] K[ennedy], “Review of Trayner’s Latin Maxims and Phrases” (1895) 7 JR 81 at 
82.   
58 H Donnellus, Commentarii ad tit De Verborum obligationis (1577). See P Stein, Roman Law in 
European History (1999) 80-2. 
59 J Cujas, De Verborum significatione (1595). For Cujas and his influence on Scots law, see J W Cairns, 
“Craig, Cujas and the definition of feudum: is a feu a usufruct?”, in P Birks (ed), New Perspectives in the 
Roman Law of Property: Essays for Barry Nicholas (1988) 75. 
60 For the canon law, see R Naz (ed), Dictionnaire de droit canonique, 7 vols (1935-65).   
61 See e.g. J C Nehrings, Historisch-politisch-juristisches Lexikon (1710); T Haymes, Teutsch-juristisches 
Lexikon (1738); C G Haltaus, Glossarium Germanicum medii aevi (1758).   
62 For further references see P Fiorelli, “Vocabulari giuridici fatti e da fare” (1947) Revista italiana per le 
scienze giuridiche (NS) 293. I am grateful to my Glasgow colleague, Dr Matteo Solinas, for obtaining for 
me a copy of this article. 
63 Répertoire méthodique et alphabétique de législation de doctrine et de jurisprudence en matière de droit 
civil, commercial, criminel, administratif de droit des gens et de droit public, 44 vols plus 19 
supplementary volumes (1845-97). 
64 In particular, F von Holtzendorff, Encyklopädie der Rechtswissenschaft (1870); there was a series of later 
editions with different editors: see for example C S, “Review of Encyclopaedia of the Laws of England” 
(1897) 9 JR 224 at 227, referring to the 4th edition. The 6th edition of 1904 attracted a Who’s Who of 
contributors from German legal science, such as Otto Lenel, Heinrich Brunner, and Otto von Gierke. 
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The beginning of the nineteenth century is marked not only by the arrival of Bell’s 
Dictionary but also by a number of slim volumes by one Peter Halkerston. Little is 
known of Halkerston’s life.65 Born, perhaps, in the first half of 1761,66 he was a member 
of the Society of Solicitors to the Supreme Courts, having been admitted to the Society in 
1791. He was the Society’s honorary librarian from 1808 to 182167 as well as bailie of 
Holyrood House.68 Halkerston always styled himself with the post-nominal designations 
“LLD SSC”69 and sometimes also with “AM”. There is no entry of Halkerston having 
matriculated or graduated from the universities of Glasgow, Edinburgh, or Aberdeen, but 
the Halkerston name, which by the eighteenth century had become less common in 
Edinburgh,70 hails from Fife and there is a record of a “Robert Halkerston” matriculating 
at St Andrews in 1776.71 This may be the same Robert Halkerston who was born on 20 
and baptised on 24 October 1762 in the Parish of Abbotshall. Although tantalisingly close 
to Peter’s likely birth date, the birth date does not corroborate Peter’s age at death and, 
together with the disparities between the given names, it is not possible, without further 
evidence, to be sure whether this is, in fact, the same person. Peter Halkerston, at any 
rate, died on 27 July 1833.72 
Instrumental, like Robert Bell, in early law reporting, Halkerston also produced a 
Compendium of decisions reported in the Faculty Collection.73 But Halkerston’s first 
foray into the literature of legal dictionaries and glossaries was a slim student’s volume, 
                                                 
65 F Watt, revised E Baigent, “Halkerston, Peter (d. c. 1833)”, Oxford DNB (2004). This brief entry appears 
largely to be based on material in J B Barclay, The SSC Story, 1784-1984 (1984).  
66 Because he was registered at his death, on 27 July 1833, as being aged 72: Old Parish Register, Deaths 
685/01 1000 0283 Edinburgh. 
67 Barclay, The SSC Story (n 65) 109, 245, 316. 
68 P Halkerston, A Treatise on the History, Law, and Privileges of the Palace and Sanctuary of Holyrood 
House (1831). Cf Register of Burials in the Chapel Royal or Abbey of Holyroodhouse: 1706-1900 (1900); J 
S Richardson, The Abbey and Palace of Holyroodhouse (3rd edn, 1950). 
69 The entry for his death contains the LLD SSC designations; while the inventory on which confirmation 
to his estate was obtained (see Edinburgh Sheriff Court Inventory, 31 Dec 1834, SC70/1/51) designs him as 
“Doctor Peter Halkerston”.   
70 Cf G F Black, The Surnames of Scotland: their origin, meaning, and history (1946, repr 1971) 338 which 
records that, in the 15th and 16th centuries, the name was common in Edinburgh. Searches of births and 
deaths in the late 18th century indicate that the name, by then, was mainly prevalent in Fife.  
71 J M Anderson, The matriculation roll of the University of St. Andrews, 1747-1897 (1905) 26. R N Smart, 
Biographical Register of the University of St Andrews 1747-1897 (2004) 365, however, indicates that this 
Robert Halkerston probably went on to Edinburgh to study medicine. 
72 Old Parish Register, Deaths, Edinburgh 685/01 1000 0283. 
73 P Halkerston, A Compendium, or General Abridgement, of the Faculty Collection of Decisions of the 
Lords of Council and Session, from February 4, 1752 to the Session of 1817 (1819). 
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today largely forgotten,74 under the title A Translation and Explanation of the Principal 
Technical Terms and Phrases used in Mr Erskine's Institute of the Law of Scotland, 
published in 1820 and which appeared in a second edition in 1829.75 Halkerston’s 
reputation, however, is based almost entirely on a related volume of maxims: A 
Collection of Latin Maxims & Rules, in Law and Equity: selected from the most eminent 
authors, on the civil, canon, feudal, English and Scots law; with an English translation, 
and an appendix of reference to the authorities from which the maxims are selected, 
published in Edinburgh in 1823.76 The father of modern legal lexicography, Brian 
Garner, together with no less a figure than Sir Robert Megarry, dedicate the majority of a 
chapter on “Maxima”, in Megarry’s final instalment of legal miscellanea, to Halkerston’s 
1823 work.77 In Scotland, however, it has long been recognised that “Latinity was not, 
however, the worthy bailie’s strong point”.78 Nonetheless, for all its faults, Halkerston’s 
Collection of Latin Maxims continues to be cited by standard Anglo-American legal 
dictionaries to this day.79  
Later Halkerston produced one of the first titles in Scots law to appear under the 
heading “Digest”, a slim volume dedicated to the law of marriage.80 Another work, on 
the law surrounding the right of debtors to sanctuary at Holyroodhouse,81 covers a topic 
which has been little touched upon by modern scholarship.82 But if the reader is 
                                                 
74 But it is planned to reproduce it as part of the forthcoming reprint, in this series, of the first edition of 
John Erskine’s An Institute of the Law of Scotland. 
75 P Halkerston, A Translation and Explanation of the Principal Technical Terms and Phrases used in Mr 
Erskine's Institute of the Law of Scotland (2nd edn, 1829).   
76 P Halkerston, A Collection of Latin Maxims & Rules, in Law and Equity: selected from the most eminent 
authors, on the civil, canon, feudal, English and Scots law; with an English translation, and an appendix of 
reference to the authorities from which the maxims are selected (1823). 
77 R Megarry, A New Miscellany at Law, ed B Garner (2005) 211-21. It may be that Professor D M Walker 
is responsible for Halkerston’s infamy, since Garner refers, in his Editor’s Note (ix), to a number of 
Walker’s “touching notes from Glasgow”. 
78 D Murray, Lawyers’ Merriments (1912) 57 n. Murray, at 275, also observes that Lord Cockburn, in 
Cockburn’s own copy of Halkerston’s maxims, had noted “a curious MS commentary”. 
79 See, for example, Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law (3rd edn by D Greenberg, 2010) sv “assignatus 
utitur jure auctoris”; Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (3rd edn by D Greenberg, 2006) sv 
“assignatus utitur jure auctoris”.  
80 P Halkerston, A Digest of the Law of Scotland, relating to Marriage (1827). 
81 Halkerston, Sanctuary of Holyrood House (n 68). Curiously, Halkerston’s work is not referred to by later 
monographs such as H Courtoy, Historical guide to the abbey and palace of Holyrood, including annals of 
the Chapel-Royal, the natural history of the environs, and the law and privileges of the sanctuary (2nd edn, 
1838) where the chapter on the “law” of sanctuary was contributed by James Marshall SSC. 
82 But the casual reader will be better served by turning to the entries in Bell’s Dictionary and Digest for 
“Abbey” and “Sanctuary”. 
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somewhat suspicious of an author who, in the preface, boasts that, inter alios, the entire 
bench of the Court of Session was individually supplied with the manuscript of his first 
foray into the area, Halkerston’s honesty, at least, is humbling:83  
 
That some errors and mistakes may have crept into a first work of this description, will not 
appear surprising, when for a moment it is considered, that, the many sources of information 
were obscure, and difficult to be traced, and when it is known that some writers had formed 
different opinions on these same interesting points treated of. 
 
Halkerston’s service and publications earned him an LLD, although the awarding 
institution remains anonymous.84 But even the receipt of an LLD may be no great 
compliment since, as Henry Goudy memorably pointed out, some of the most egregious 
plagiarism, on occasion, has been admonished only with the conferral of an LLD degree 
– or two.85 
 
 
Bell’s Dictionary (and Digest): the seven editions 
 
In his “Historical Introduction” to the Oxford English Dictionary in 1933, the editor 
wrote that:  
 
If there is any truth in the old Greek maxim that a large book is a great evil, English 
dictionaries have been steadily growing worse ever since their inception more than three 
                                                 
83 P Halkerston, Sanctuary of Holyrood House (n 68) vi.  
84 As is pointed out by W Innes Addison, A Roll of the Graduates of the University of Glasgow, from 31st 
December, 1727 to 31st December, 1897: with short biographical notes (1898) vi, records of honorary 
graduates at Glasgow were not kept until the second half of the 19th century.   
85 H Goudy, “Plagiarism – a fine art” (1908) 20 JR 302, reviewing Hannis Taylor’s Science of 
Jurisprudence (1908). Goudy, editor of the 2nd edition of James Muirhead’s Historical Introduction to the 
Law of Rome, noticed that whole passages of Taylor’s work had been plagiarised from Muirhead (and other 
works too). At 314-315 Goudy observed that “the author is an Honorary Doctor of Laws of two British 
universities [Edinburgh and Dublin]. This is perhaps not surprising, as honorary degrees are not always 
conferred by universities with discrimination…”    
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centuries ago. To set Cawdry’s slim small volume of 160486 beside the completed Oxford 
Dictionary of 1933 is like placing the original acorn beside the oak that has grown out of it. 
 
The same is true of Bell’s Dictionary and Digest. Only the first three editions bear to be 
the work of the original author, Robert Bell. Robert’s son, William, took over the 
editorship in 1826 and, by 1838, William’s input was such that he no longer felt justified 
in attributing any of the content to his father: henceforth, the “Bell” in the expanded title 
of Dictionary and Digest is a reference to William, not Robert. The genesis of the 
Dictionary, however, is not always easy to follow and it is worth setting out its various 
incarnations:  
 
A Dictionary of the Law of Scotland intended for the use of the public at large, as 
well as of the profession by Robert Bell, WS, Lecturer on Conveyancing, 
appointed by the Society of Writers to the Signet, 2 vols (1807-1808) 
A Dictionary of the Law of Scotland intended for the use of the public at large, as 
well as of the profession by Robert Bell, Esq, Advocate, Lecturer on 
Conveyancing, second edition, 2 vols (1815)  
A Dictionary of the Law of Scotland by Robert Bell, Esq, Advocate, Lecturer on 
Conveyancing appointed by the Society of Writers to the Signet, third edition 
revised and greatly enlarged by William Bell, Esq, Advocate (1826) 
A Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland, with short explanations of the most 
ordinary English law terms by William Bell, Esq, Advocate (1838) 
A Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland with short explanations of the most 
ordinary English law terms by the late William Bell, Esq, Advocate. Revised and 
corrected, with numerous additions, by George Ross, Esq, Advocate (1861) 
Bell’s Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland, adapted to the present state of 
the law and in great part re-written by George Watson, MA Advocate (1882) 
Bell’s Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland, seventh edition by George 
Watson, MA Advocate, and of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law (1890) 
 
                                                 
86 R Cawdry, A Table Alphabeticall: conteyning and teaching the true writing, and vnderstanding of hard 
vsuall English wordes, borrowed from the Hebrew, Greeke, Latine, or French, &c (1604). 
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To trace the development of Robert Bell’s Dictionary is, in a modest way, to follow the 
development of Scots law at some of the most formative periods of its history; and the 
history of the Dictionary also introduces a number of the characters of these periods, 
some well-known, others less so.  
  
 
Robert Bell 
 
Early life and background 
Robert Bell was probably born in 1758,87 the eldest son of an impoverished Episcopal 
minister, Rev William Bell (1704-1779)88 and his second wife, Margaret Morrice 
(sometimes Morice), also an Episcopalian. The family was William’s second: not only 
did his first wife, Lilias Grahame, predecease William in 1750, all the children 
predeceased Lilias.89 Undeterred by the inevitable unhappiness that he must have endured 
losing his wife and all of his children, William again sought solace in family life and, at 
the age of 56, started a family for the second time. By the time he fathered his youngest 
and most famous son, Charles (1774-1842), he was 70 years of age. Between Robert and 
Charles were two other brothers, John (1763-1820) and George Joseph (1770-1843), as 
well as two other siblings, probably sisters, of whom little is known other than that they 
appear to have survived infancy.90 The persecution of the Episcopalians following the ’45 
rebellion may have been the primary cause of the Rev William’s privations; but so too 
might the fact that he had no family support: his own father, a Presbyterian minister,91 
had died while he was four years old; and, while at university, William had renounced his 
Presbyterianism in favour of  “the one catholic and Apostolic Church in Scotland… by 
                                                 
87 The register of his death, which occurred on 1 November 1816, records that he was then 58 years of age: 
Old Parish Register, Deaths 685/03 0310 0107 Canongate. The Oxford DNB indicates only that Robert was 
born “around 1760”.   
88 D M Bertie, Scottish Episcopal Clergy, 1689-2000 (2000) 12. 
89 Letters of Sir Charles Bell, selected from his Correspondence with his brother, George Joseph Bell 
(1870) 7. 
90 Charles, the youngest son, writes of his father’s death, in 1779, leaving his mother to care for a family of 
six children: Ibid 10. 
91 H Scott (ed), Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae: the Succession of Ministers in the Church of Scotland from the 
Reformation, vol 1: Synod of Lothian and Tweeddale (1915) 366, “Bell, John”, latterly minister of 
Gladsmuir, near Haddington. The FES attributes to him authorship of the anonymously published tract, An 
Ingenuous and Scientific Discourse on Witchcraft (1705).   
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this change, tho’ I lost the countenance of my relations (my br Joseph excepted), yet was 
never destitute of friends”.92   
It is a curious feature of the published correspondence between Charles and George 
that Robert is scarcely mentioned. At one point Charles writes that, while the affections 
of his childhood centred on his mother and brother George, “Robert was most kind to me. 
I was his play fellow and pet”,93  and there are a couple of other passing mentions.94 But 
we do know from the editor that Robert was a regular subject of correspondence between 
Charles and George, particularly as a result of Robert’s death. The “anxieties and 
sorrows” connected with the death of Robert were, according to the editor, “the principal 
subjects of correspondence between George and Charles in 1816 and 1817.”95 That 
correspondence, however, does not seem to have survived.   
Part of Robert’s obscurity is relative: his reputation as a jurist was largely eclipsed, 
even in his own life, by that of his younger brother, George Joseph: Advocate, Professor 
of Scots Law in the University of Edinburgh, and Principal Clerk of Session.96 George 
Joseph would become the last jurist in Scots law sufficiently revered to earn 
“institutional” status. But both Robert and George were in turn eclipsed by the brothers 
who chose medicine rather than law for their profession: John Bell was “the premier 
surgeon of Edinburgh for nearly twenty years” until he left the city, for Italy, in 1817,97 
while Charles, later Sir Charles, was described three decades after his death as “a truly 
great man”: the “founder of scientific neurology”, no less.98  
Admitted as Writer to the Signet on 22 June 1784,99 Robert’s contributions to Scots 
law have four distinct strands – as a law reporter, law teacher, legal writer, and advocate 
– and each merits consideration. 
                                                 
92 Letters of Sir Charles Bell (n 89) 4. 
93 Ibid 11. 
94 Ibid 46, 74, 123 
95 Ibid 260 n. 
96 For George Joseph, see generally, K G C Reid, “From text-book to book of authority: the Principles of 
George Joseph Bell” (2011) 15 Edin LR 6. 
97 K Grudzien Baston, “Bell, John (1763-1820)” Oxford DNB (2004). 
98 F Arnold, “Sir Charles Bell” (1875) 91 Fraser’s Magazine 88. A more balanced appraisal is L C Jacyna, 
“Bell, Sir Charles (1774-1842)” Oxford DNB (2004). 
99 F J Grant, A History of the Society of Writers to Her Majesty's Signet (1890) 16. On admission as a WS, 
Robert Bell ipso facto ceased to be a member of the Juridical Society of Edinburgh: History of the Juridical 
Society of Edinburgh (1875) 8, 13-15, 118. This explains the numerous entries for “resignation” on the roll 
of the Society, Robert Bell included. 
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Law reporter 
Robert Bell, it is no exaggeration to say, is the father of modern Scottish law reporting. 
Although, by the end of the eighteenth century, there were many collections of decisions 
of the Court of Session, these were of limited utility: they recited the facts, the arguments 
of counsel, and the court’s decision but without giving the legal basis of that decision. 
They lacked, in other words, the core information which offers the main incentive for 
reading modern law reports.   
A system where judges do not provide detailed reasons is not one where precedent 
plays a major role. But one can look at matters from the other way around too: without 
any records of grounds for decision, a system of precedent must develop slowly. Only 
with a “constant tract of decisions” could decisions of the Session establish a point of 
law.100 By Robert Bell’s time, it was clear that Mackenzie’s view of Scots law – to some 
extent held also by Bankton – that the underlying law of Scotland was the civil law, no 
longer held sway. “The civil law… is now reduced to that place which it always ought to 
have had,” Robert would write in the preface to his first volume of decisions. “It serves 
only to enrich the pleading of the lawyer, or by its wisdom to aid the decision of the 
judge.”  “The law of this country”, he added, “consists principally of the decisions of the 
Court of Session”.101 
There were other reasons too why a young lawyer might have ventured to make his 
own attempt at law reporting. In the first place, the lack of any record of the reasons for a 
decision rendered justice wholly lacking in transparency; for all the public knew, the 
arguments may have had no bearing whatsoever on their Lordships’ decisions; without 
law reports, said Stair, judges were like arbiters deciding ex aequo et bono: there was no 
way of establishing whether “like cases have like events”.102 Secondly, and more 
prosaically, the members of the Faculty of Advocates who were tasked with the 
responsibility of compiling the Faculty’s own reports, the Faculty Collection, were often 
                                                 
100 See generally J W Cairns, “Attitudes to codification and the Scottish science of legislation, 1600-1830” 
(2007) 22 Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 1 at 14-25.  The quote is from Mackenzie. 
101 R Bell, Cases decided in the Court of Session, from November 1790 to July 1792 (1794) vi-vii. 
102 J Dalrymple, Decisions of the Lords of Council and Session, in the Most Important Cases Debate before 
Them (1683) I, vi. Cf Dr Johnson’s comments on the power of the Lord President’s casting vote in cases of 
deadlock: J Boswell, Life of Johnson (ed R W Chapman, 1998) 523. 
 xxiii 
decades behind in their work. As Lord Stewart, who has done so much to illuminate this 
episode of our history, remarks: “the Faculty’s record of publication to the lieges was one 
of high promise and low achievement.”103   
The unsatisfactory state of affairs would have presented an opportunity to a young 
man like Robert Bell. Like many revolutionary steps, Robert’s approach was simplicity 
itself: he sat in the court and noted down what the judges said was the rationale for a 
decision. The results – Bell’s Octavo Cases104 and Bell’s Folio Cases105 – were the first 
Scottish law reports of the modern age. But Bell received little thanks for his labours.  
Quite the contrary: the combined force of the Edinburgh legal establishment was set up 
against him and he received, says T B Smith, only “threats and obstruction”.106 In 
pioneering his approach Robert had encroached upon the twin privileges of, first, the 
Faculty of Advocates – a body modern scholarship has demonstrated was then concerned 
as much with vested self-interest as anything else107 – to promulgate court decisions,108 
and, secondly, the judges to say what they liked without fear of attribution. Both the 
Faculty and at least some of the Lords of Session took umbrage. Cockburn records that 
some considered Robert’s actions verging on contempt: an offence, Lord Cockburn wryly 
observed, “aggravated by its accuracy”. “The fellow taks doon ma’ very words”, was 
Lord Eskgrove’s incriminating reaction to Robert’s presence in the Court.109 The Lords 
were sufficiently affronted to set up a commission to consider the issue.110 Eventually, 
Robert wrote personally to the Lord President to explain his position. A committee of the 
                                                 
103 A Stewart, “Introduction”, in A Stewart and D Parrett (eds), The Minute Book of the Faculty of 
Advocates: Volume 4, 1783-1798 (Stair Society vol 53, 2008) xxix-xxx.   
104 R Bell, Cases decided in the Court of Session, from November 1790 to July 1792 (1794).  
105 R Bell, Cases decided in the Court of Session, during summer session 1794,-winter session 1794-5, and 
summer session 1795: Collected by appointment of the Society of Clerks to the Signet (1796).   
106 T B Smith, The Doctrine of Judicial Precedent in Scots Law (1957) 11-12.   
107 The text is a crude simplification of a complicated history. Two chapters of it are elegantly told in J W 
Cairns, “Alfenus Varus and the Faculty of Advocates: Roman visions and the manners that were fit for 
admission to the bar in the eighteenth century” (2001) 28 Ius Commune: Zeitschrift für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte 203; J W Cairns, “The face that did not fit: race, appearance and exclusion from the bar in 
eighteenth century Scotland” (2003) 9 Fundamina: A Journal of Legal History 11. 
108 Twenty-five years later, however, one writer suggested, looking at the English model, that the Faculty’s 
privilege, if privilege it was, could not be exclusive, for the right to promulgate decisions of the Court was 
part of the Royal prerogative: Anon, Address to the Right Honourable Lord President Hope and to the 
Members of the College of Justice on the Method of Collecting and Reporting Decisions (1821) 9 ff. 
109 Lord Cockburn, Memorials of His Time (1856) 165, to which Cockburn adds: “a great injury to his 
Lordship, certainly”. For Cockburn’s observations on David Rae, Lord “Esky” Eskgrove, see Memorials 
118-25.   
110 AS 12 November 1796, Committee as to Mr Robert Bell’s Decisions. 
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WS Society also met with all the judges of the Court to discuss the matter. The result was 
a classic compromise. Lord President Campbell, on behalf of the Court, apparently 
indicated that he “highly approved of the institution of a course of lectures on 
conveyancing as a desideratum hitherto in the legal education of the country” and, in 
return for Robert agreeing to give up reporting, offered to support the creation of a full 
professorship in conveyancing at Edinburgh University. With that in view, it was 
suggested that a memorial be presented to the Court.111 Quite what role the Court was to 
have in supporting the creation of a chair is unclear; but, be that as it may, Robert thus 
agreed to give up reporting what fell from the judges’ lips.112  
In the event, the suggestion to submit a memorial was to cause Bell more problems 
than it solved, for it gave the Faculty of Advocates the opportunity to formulate a number 
of “strong and solid objections” to the establishment of a chair, primarily on the ground 
that it would infringe on the existing privileges of the holder of the Chair of Scots Law 
and that it was undesirable to create a situation where there were “two rival Professors of 
the same Science, mutually jealous of each other, and each anticipating the other’s 
emoluments”.113  It may be, however, that one cause of the Faculty’s objections was 
found in Bell’s outline of classes which, among other things, proposed that students’ 
ability to draft deeds should be assessed in the language of practice – English. This may 
have been seen as an implied criticism of the Faculty’s own laborious system of trials on 
Digest titles assigned in strict chronological order, and in Latin.114 
History, however, has judged Robert Bell’s pioneering reports well and considerably 
better than those of the one man whose privileged access to the Session Papers, the 
Professor of Scots Law, David Hume, was supposed to guarantee accuracy:115  
                                                 
111 Grant, Writers to Her Majesty’s Signet (n 99) 424; Stewart and Parratt, Minute Book (n 103) 228-9 n 
358. 
112 But Robert did continue to report other processes of interest: as, for example, the learned arguments of 
the respective counsel, Thomas Thomson and Francis Jeffrey, in a marriage case that was settled after 
argument but before decision. Perhaps as a result of his experiences to date, he made no attempt to publish 
them during his lifetime: see R Bell, Report of a case of legitimacy under a putative marriage: tried before 
the Second Division of the Court of Session in February 1811 (1825).  
113 Stewart and Parratt, Minute Book (n 103) 237. 
114 Ibid 235-42. 
115 Wilson’s Trs v Wilson (1856) 18 D 1096 at 1103 per Lord Justice Clerk Hope.  Stewart and Parrett, 
Minute Book (n 103)145 n 237 indicate that Robert Bell, in contrast, spent five to eight hours a day on the 
work of noting and arranging his notes of proceedings, “invariably writing out the opinions for the judges 
from his notes the same day”.   
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This is not the only instance in which the inaccuracy of these reports has been ascertained.  
They were drawn up in most disadvantaged circumstances after the elapse of a great many 
years.  The Session Papers show that Baron Hume had often taken but few notes, and relied on 
the Session Papers alone.  In this case he had only made a short jotting.  In this, as in various 
other instances, the note-books of Lord President Hope show that he had entirely mistaken the 
case.   
 
Competition from Bell’s Octavo and Folio Cases, however, appears not to have 
galvanised the Faculty of Advocates into doing better. Notwithstanding the splitting of 
the Court of Session into two divisions in 1808, law reporting reached an all-time low in 
1818 with only 47 cases being reported – a number, one anonymous writer reflected, 
which was “not half the numbers reported yearly by Lord Durie and Lord Stair almost 
two centuries ago.”116 The same writer, however, was in doubt as to whether it was either 
“delicate or judicious” for a reporter to attempt to make a verbatim note of a judge’s 
stated reasons for decision.117  And even the Session Cases, which began in 1821, did not 
provide many detailed verbatim reports of opinions until the 1830s. As a law reporter, it 
seems, Robert Bell was indeed a visionary. 
 
Law teacher 
As a teacher of law too, Robert Bell was a pioneer. But in law teaching, as in law 
reporting, he was faced with constant obstacles and discouragements. By the 1790s there 
were already three public chairs of law at the University of Edinburgh – the Regius Chair 
of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations (1707)118 and the Chairs of Civil Law 
(1709) and of Scots Law (1722). In Glasgow, meanwhile, the Regius Chair of Civil Law 
had been inaugurated in 1713. But the holders of these chairs, as university professors, 
                                                 
116 Anon, Address to the Right Honourable Lord President Hope and to the Members of the College of 
Justice on the Method of Collecting and Reporting Decisions (1821) 3. J S Leadbetter, “The printed law 
reports, 1540-1935”, in Sources and Literature (n 32) 46, records that this pamphlet is “known to be by 
Robert Hannay, Advocate”.     
117 Ibid 46-9. Curiously, the author laments – despite 2 editions of Robert Bell’s Dictionary – that, for the 
assistance of inexperienced reporters, “we have no dictionary of law terms” (54). 
118 The Regius Chair of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations having been inaugurated in 1707: 
see J W Cairns, “The origins of the Edinburgh Law School: the Union of 1707 and the Regius Chair” 
(2007) 11 Edin LR 300. 
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focussed on what may loosely be described as “academic law”.119 No one, at that time, 
was teaching the type of law that many lawyers actually practised. So the need for a 
course of instruction that sought to blend matters of deep principle with the more prosaic 
ingenuity of daily practice had, by the last quarter of the eighteenth century, become 
evident. Walter Ross WS had been invited by the WS Society to give a series of private 
lectures on conveyancing in 1783 and 1784, which formed the basis for the two volumes 
which appeared, posthumously, in 1792120 following Ross’s sudden death – reputedly in 
a fit of laughter – in 1789.121  Ross’s lectures had demonstrated that there was a demand, 
and his death left a vacancy. 
In 1793 Bell, supported by the writer to whom he had been apprenticed, William 
Macdonald, proposed to the WS Society a series of lectures on conveyancing. After 
asking for and considering the proposed course,122 the Society appointed Bell as lecturer 
in conveyancing in November 1793. Perhaps due to his work on the Octavo Cases,123 
however, it was not until December 1794 that he was able to deliver an inaugural “short 
course” of lectures. From the outset, Bell was faced with the same sort of problems that 
face new lecturers today. Room bookings, for instance, posed a particular difficulty: as 
late as the end of November 1794 Bell is seen politely reminding the Society of his need 
for a room in which to deliver his lectures. Disappointingly, perhaps, the Society’s 
response, even for this apparently simple administrative task, was classic institutional 
inertia: formation of a committee. More disappointingly still, the committee then directed 
all of its efforts to finding Robert a room anywhere but within the Society’s own 
premises. Representations were made to the Lord Provost, for use of a University room, 
                                                 
119 Cf K Reid, “Property”, in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland 
(2000) vol 1, 206. 
120 W Ross, Lectures on the Practice of the Law of Scotland (1792). A second edition was published in 
1822 under the title Lectures on the History and Practice of the Law of Scotland relative to Conveyancing 
and Legal Diligence. 
121 K J Campbell, “Ross, Walter (1738-1789)” Oxford DNB (2004); Grant, Writers to Her Majesty’s Signet 
(n 99) cviii. Ross’s motivations – at least those suitable for public airing – are in his To the members of the 
College of Justice (1782). The WS Society was here ahead of its counterpart in Glasgow, the Faculty of 
Procurators, whose first lecturer in Conveyancing, James Galloway, was appointed in 1816. His lectures 
were published 20 years later: J Galloway, Lectures on Conveyancing: embracing commentaries on the 
authentication or testing, and on the general requisites of the deeds (1838). The written style, at least, 
displays a palpable enthusiasm for the subject. 
122 R Bell, Outlines of the course of lectures on conveyancing, established by the Society of Clerks to the 
Signet. With a concentrated view of the clauses of deeds (1800). 
123 Stewart and Parrett, Minute Book (n 103) 145 n 237.  
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as well as to the Dean of Faculty. Only when these representations produced no offers of 
support did the committee reluctantly accept, on 14 January 1795, that “the lectures 
having been advertised for the following Thursday, it was agreed to grant their own 
lecturer the use of the signet hall for the purpose”.  This arrangement was continued until 
at least early 1796.124   
As it happens, it was only in 1795-1796 that Robert Bell was able to deliver the 
lectures on the first part of his course, and it was 1797 before he began to deliver the 
second part.125 Somewhere along the way, however, there must have been difficulties 
since, almost fifteen years later, on 4 February 1811, the Society librarian – who would, 
in time, succeed Robert as the lecturer in conveyancing – one Macvey Napier, moved a 
resolution at a meeting of the Society that “Mr Bell be permitted to lecture in the hall at 
such hour as the society should deem most convenient”; the society’s lecturer, recorded 
Napier, had in the meantime been forced to deliver his lectures in a Masonic hall.126 In 
the course of his teaching, Bell appears to have encountered other challenges familiar to 
the professional academic: insufficient library provision,127 and bad student feedback 
arising from his plan to divide his material into two discrete courses, leading to 
complaints of expense and inconvenience.128  
Although his lectures appear to have proved popular and well-regarded, Robert Bell’s 
position as a lecturer found little material encouragement. As has been seen, just when it 
looked like his agreement to give up law reporting would win him the security of a chair 
of conveyancing at Edinburgh University, the Faculty of Advocates intervened, on behalf 
of the holder of the Chair of Scots Law, David Hume, effectively blocking the chair. This 
may have played some part in Bell’s decision, over a decade later, to seek admission to 
the Faculty of Advocates. With Hume’s resignation from the Chair of Scots Law in 1822, 
on his elevation to the Exchequer Court, Robert Bell’s brother, George Joseph, was 
appointed as Professor of Scots Law and, with his support, a Chair of Conveyancing was 
                                                 
124 Grant, Writers to Her Majesty’s Signet (n 99) 422-3. 
125 For all this see Ibid cx-cxi and cxv. 
126 Ibid cxi. 
127 R Bell, Memorial relative to the library of the Writers to the Signet etc, humbly submitted to the 
consideration of the members (1800).  
128 Grant, Writers to Her Majesty’s Signet (n 99) cxvi. 
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instituted in 1824. But by then Robert Bell had been dead for eight years and the first 
holder of the Chair was Macvey Napier. 
 
Legal writer 
Being actively engaged in teaching, Robert Bell would have felt acutely the need for 
appropriate books. And, like many in his position, finding nothing to hand, he set about 
writing the types of book he would wish his students to have. As he remarked in his 
Forms of Deeds:129  
 
I find it necessary, in order to leave room for other matters in my Lectures, that I should have 
a Collection arranged in the same order, and accompanied with such hints of the history of the 
deed, as may render it in many cases unnecessary to consume time on that part of my subject, 
and so allow me to give the whole course to practical views, and to that information which the 
Conveyancer will require when he enters into business. 
 
The Dictionary, therefore, is only one of Bell’s works. In fact his output was prolific.130 
In addition to his System of the Forms of Deeds used in Scotland – which, by the third 
edition of 1811-1817, extended to seven volumes plus an abridgement – there was a 
monograph derived from his lectures on the subject of execution of deeds131 – later 
described by Lord Deas as an “authoritative treatise”132 – as well as works on leases133 
and conveyancing134 and a less well-known treatise on the law of elections135 (which, 
                                                 
129 R Bell, A System of the Forms of Deeds used in Scotland (1797) vol I, 3. 
130 It is unexpected that the Oxford DNB entry for George Joseph Bell, by Professor W M Gordon, should 
contain a more generous and accurate description of Robert Bell than Robert Bell’s own entry; Gordon 
justly describes Robert as “a lawyer of some distinction”.  
131 R Bell, Lectures on the Solemnities used in Scotland, in the Testing of Deeds (1795).  This book remains 
of value in the 21st century. In 1796 it was presented by Bell, together with his Octavo and Folio Cases, as 
the first donations to the library of the Juridical Society of Edinburgh: see History of the Juridical Society 
of Edinburgh (1875) 17.  
132 Smith v Chambers’ Trs (1877) 5 R 97 at 114. 
133 R Bell, A Treatise on Leases: explaining the nature and effect of the contract of lease, and pointing out 
the legal rights enjoyed by the parties (1803; 2nd edn 1805; 3rd edn by W Bell, 1820; 4th edn by W Bell, 
1825-6).   
134 R Bell, A Treatise on the Conveyance of Land to a Purchaser, and on the manner of completing his title 
(1815; 2nd edn by W Bell, 1828; 3rd edn by W Bell, 1830). 
135 R Bell, A Treatise on the Election Laws, as they relate to the representation of Scotland, in the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (1812).  It was cited to the court in Gray v 
Mags of Anstruther Wester 29 June 1819 FC.   
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prior to the Reform Act of 1832, gave rise to all sorts of land law questions). All remain 
of value today and it is worthy of observation that no one since has sought to write a 
monograph on deeds, though execution of deeds is no less important today than it was in 
Bell’s time.136 “The subject which I have chosen” wrote Bell in his introduction to that 
book, “does not admit of much ornament, nor of deep investigation, but it has this 
advantage at least, that, while it is in some degree insulated, it is also of much practical 
importance”.137 The same could be written today. Bell’s foundational part in modern law-
reporting, his role in legal education, as well as his major contributions to the legal 
literature, justifiably secure his place in the annals of Scottish legal history.   
 
The Dictionary 
The first edition of the Dictionary was published in 1807 and the second in 1815, shortly 
before Robert Bell’s death in 1816. Much later these editions were to be characterised by 
George Watson, a subsequent editor, as little more than a manual for the merchant and 
the country gentleman: the scope was “comparatively limited, and they contained little 
more than a short and popular explanation of Scottish law terms, with hardly any 
reference to authorities”.138 But that judgement does not accord with Bell’s own words; 
for although thinking that the Dictionary “cannot be entirely unimportant to the merchant 
or the country gentleman”, he saw his main audience as “those young men who mean to 
make the law their profession.” He continued:139 
 
The student of the law does not (I may be allowed to say) enjoy the advantage of any proper 
introductory book; for although Mr Erskine’s small Treatise,140 which he entitled “Principles 
of the Law of Scotland” be very accurate … yet it may be justly doubted whether it be well 
adapted for the perusal of a young man entirely unacquainted with the subject.141 The brevity 
and conciseness which, joined to its accuracy, forms its great merit, in one point of view is 
                                                 
136 Cf R Rennie and D J Cusine, The Requirements of Writing (1995).   
137 R Bell, Testing of Deeds (n 131) iv. 
138 G Watson, Bell’s Dictionary and Digest (6th edn, 1882) v. 
139 R Bell, Dictionary (1807) vi-vii. Cf 2nd edn (1815) ix-x. 
140 In the second edition of 1815, Robert Bell refers to Erskine’s Principles as “Mr Erskine’s smaller 
Institute”. 
141 In the 2nd edition, the following sentence is here inserted into the preface: “The work was designed as a 
textbook for the author’s lectures; and professes rather to point out the great principles than to dwell on the 
more minute points which require explanation.” 
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little calculated to satisfy those doubts, which arise in the course of a systematical course of 
reading, and which, while unsatisfied, distract and interrupt the student; and, without the aid of 
lectures, it is always felt as a forbidding and dry book, little calculated to facilitate his 
progress, or to draw him on to the study of his profession. 
 
Of particular interest is the reference to the “those doubts which arise in the course of a 
systematic course of reading”.  
There is little indication of why Bell decided to put the dictionary together. But there 
are traces, in his earlier works, of a concern to convey the meaning of technical words, an 
interest which goes beyond what is required for the reader to understand the passage in 
question. So, for instance, in his work on Leases, Bell explains “horning” with a footnote 
which is a prototype Dictionary entry:142   
 
Blowing a man to the horn was the ancient form of seeking for an offender from county to 
county, and where he was not to be found, it was followed by outlawry. This was introduced 
into civil business; and, when a debtor refused to obey the King’s letters, he was blown to the 
horn as an offender, and declared guilty of rebellion. It was on this ground, that imprisonment 
proceeded, and that the debtor was imprisoned as a rebel of the King. Part of the punishment 
which the weakness of government rendered necessary, was, the falling of the debtor’s 
escheat, [which, in a manner, armed one part of the kingdom against the other in favour of the 
laws]; and when a man remained for a year under denunciation for rebellion, or, in technical 
language, at the horn, his liferent escheat fell and was gifted at the pleasure of the Crown. It 
was by that most fortunate statute, 20 Geo II, c 50 that civil rebellion, as well as ward holding, 
were abolished. 
 
This description would be illuminating for both layman and lawyer alike, primarily 
because it is so readable. There is a danger of mistaking accessibility for lack of depth. 
When the first and second editions of the Dictionary were published, they were bound 
with a reprint of Skene’s De Verborum Significatione, Bell professing that his Dictionary 
“goes little into the history, and in no shape into the antiquities of the law: Therefore, in 
some measure to supply the defect, there has been added, as an appendix, Skene’s 
                                                 
142 Bell, Treatise on Leases (2nd edn) (n 133) 27 n. The bracketed words were, in later editions, edited out 
by Robert’s son, William.  
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Treatise, De Verborum Significatione, which the reader prefer in its original shape…”.143 
Again, although Bell’s Dictionary was considerably more concise than the later editions, 
it is going too far to suggest that it was designed for laymen. Bell’s suggestion that the 
Dictionary would be useful for gentlemen may have been no more than an attempt to 
persuade as many people as possible to buy it. 
It is certainly evident from some of the definitions that Robert Bell was endowed with 
the skill of concise and perceptive formulation. One example will have to suffice. The 
entry for “Acceptance – 1. Acceptance of a Deed” reads:144 
 
As delivery is a necessary solemnity, indicating on the part of the granter of the deed his 
intention to render the deed completely binding on himself, so, on the other hand, the 
acceptance of the deed by the person in whose favour it is granted, is necessary to render it 
binding on him. The receiver cannot, from the mere circumstance of the deed’s being in his 
possession, be held to have accepted it. On the contrary, the presumption is, that he received it 
for the purpose of considering the nature and effect of it, before he should decide whether he 
ought or ought not to accept of it. There must, therefore, be some positive act of acceptance, 
indicating, clearly and decidedly, his intention to accept of the deed. Thus, a verbal acceptance 
of the deed, – acting under it, – deriving a benefit from it, – taking infeftment on it, – or even 
putting it on record, will be held as acts of acceptance, and these acts may be proved either by 
writing or by witnesses. Ersk. B. 3. Tit.2. § 45. 
 
That entry has not survived in the later editions which, understandably, focus instead on 
elaborating the principles of delivery of deeds by reference to the case law.145 But those 
later editions, as a result, lose something of the fundamentals and, in particular, one 
crucial point highlighted by Bell, that delivery is a bilateral act. It is of interest too that 
many of Bell’s entries go deep into principle rather than detail, with any further 
references focussing on the opinions of other legal writers rather than cases.146 And 
although the success of the Dictionary has been largely attributed to William Bell’s later 
                                                 
143 R Bell, Dictionary (1807) viii. 
144 R Bell, Dictionary (1807) 5-6.  
145 See e.g. G Watson, Bell’s Dictionary and Digest (7th edn, 1890) sv “deeds”; “deeds, delivery of”. 
146 R Bell, Dictionary (1807) sv “diligence”, discussing Stair’s analysis; “disposition”, criticising Kames’ 
view that ownership of land passed on delivery of the disposition.     
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work, it is worth recording that there is at least one instance of Robert Bell’s Dictionary 
being cited to the Court before William came to be involved.147   
Whatever its reputation, then or now, it is worth emphasising that, in Robert’s own 
opinion, his Dictionary was a work for which he had a special affinity, and a volume he 
considered worthy of attention. In the last edition of Forms of Deeds for which he was 
responsible, Robert, in dedicating his work to the WS Society he had so long served, 
allowed himself a brief retrospective: 148 
 
I shall say nothing of the decisions I have collected, because these must have come more 
immediately under your notice, and were indeed the means by which I gained your 
confidence, and was judged fit for the task I was anxious to undertake. Neither shall I take 
notice of other treatises which I have been induced to publish, because these will probably be 
sufficiently known to the members of the Society. But I beg leave to call your attention to a 
merely elementary book, less likely to fall into your hands, being intended for the use of the 
student, – I refer to the Law Dictionary. I had felt, in my own case, that however excellent Mr 
Erskine’s Institutes of the law may be, and however well fitted the smaller Institute may 
appear for the use of the student, some more elementary book was required, which might give 
a more direct and fuller explanation of law terms than an Institute can give; and the form of a 
Dictionary, while it requires this fuller explanation, admits also of short treatises, easily 
comprehended, and which do not require that continuity of attention which must be given to 
an Institute. It was the explanations it affords – the shortness of the dissertations, – the ease 
with which such views may be followed and fully comprehended, – the facility with which the 
explanation it contains may be applied to the case for which the book is turned up, – and the 
power of laying it aside and resuming it at all times, without distracting the attention of the 
reader, or breaking in on the chain of connexion in his subject, that renders the form of a 
dictionary so useful and commodious a means of acquiring that general and floating 
knowledge which a young man has occasion for, before he sits down to a more regular and 
systematical study of his profession. It was with these considerations that induced me to offer 
this elementary book to the student; and if it serves, as I trust it does, to introduce him to his 
more elaborate and more useful studies, it will have performed a duty of no mean importance. 
 
                                                 
147 Hamilton v Bogle 23 Feb 1819 FC. 
148 R Bell, A System of the Forms of Deeds used in Scotland, vol 1 (3rd edn, 1811) v-vii. 
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Admission as an advocate 
Perhaps as a result of the obstacles placed in his way by the Faculty of Advocates, Robert 
Bell took the unusual step, in his fifties, of petitioning for admission as an advocate. He 
was admitted on 7 July 1812 and appears to have practised for the last four-and-a-half 
years of his life.149 Lord Stewart ventures that Robert may have been the last intrant to 
deliver to the Lords, from a corner of the bench, his syllogistic thesis on a title of the 
Digest, in the form of the Latin “harangue”.150 Ironically, had Robert sought to join the 
Faculty twenty years earlier, not long after George Joseph was admitted, he might have 
been assigned the Digest title to which the history of all legal dictionaries owes so much: 
De diversis regulis iuris. For, in the 1790s, the Faculty’s rather unenlightened approach 
to assigning titles – proceeding in strict chronological order – was coming to its 
inevitable conclusion, and on 25 June 1796 one Robert Semple was publicly examined on 
D.50.17 de diversis regulis iuris. The next intrant, examined the same day (John Peter 
Grant of Rothiemurcus), began the whole cycle afresh with title 1, book 1.151 
What of Robert Bell’s four years of practice at the bar? If the reported cases of the 
period may be taken as a rough guide, Bell’s practice was not insignificant, although 
assessment is made more difficult by an intermittent failure by the Faculty Collection 
reporters to indicate which “Bell” was counsel.152 In at least one case, Strachan v Knox & 
Co’s Tr,153 Robert appeared for one side with George Joseph instructed on the other – 
                                                 
149 F J Grant, The Faculty of Advocates in Scotland, 1532-1943 (1944) 13. See too K J Campbell, “Bell, 
Robert (c. 1760-1816)”, Oxford DNB (2004).  
150 A Stewart, “Introduction”, in Stewart and Parrett, Minute Book (n 103) xxxiv. The wonderful 
description of the proceeding as a “harangue” comes from the first holder of the Regius Chair of Civil Law 
at Glasgow, William Forbes: W Forbes, A Journal of the Session, Containing the Decisions of the Lords 
and Council and Session in the Most Important Cases Determin’d from February 1705, until November 
1713: and the Acts of Sederunt made in that Time (1714) viii. For an overview of the Faculty of Advocates’ 
entrance procedure, see generally J W Cairns, “Historical Introduction”, in Reid and Zimmermann (eds), 
History of Private Law (n 119) vol 1, 125-9, 155-6. 
151 Stewart and Parratt, Minute Book (n 103) 224. 
152 There are many cases in which one Bell was instructed with [John] Clerk: “Bell et Clerk”. This could 
have been either John Clerk, later Lord Eldin (1757-1830), or John’s brother, William Clerk. Robert Bell 
dedicated his Treatise on the Conveyance of Land to a Purchaser, and on the manner of completing his title 
(1815) to John Clerk, so it may be that the “Bell et Clerk” references are to Robert Bell and John Clerk. 
Another clue is that George Joseph Bell was normally distinguished with the initials of his two given 
names. If so, then Robert’s practice, at least on the basis of reported decisions (an unsure guide, given the 
defects in contemporary law reporting), was not inconsiderable. John Clerk’s practice, at any rate, was so 
extensive that, at one time, he reputedly “had nearly half the business of the court in his hands”: G F R 
Barker revised A M Godfrey, “Clerk, John Lord Eldin (1757-1832)”, Oxford DNB (2004). 
153 21 Jan 1817 FC. 
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with both citing to the court the third edition of George’s Commentaries.154 By the time 
opinions had been advised, however, Robert was dead.155   
Robert Bell’s first professional society, in its History, summarised his career in this 
way:156 
 
Mr Bell does not appear to have been discouraged by either the smallness of the emoluments 
which he had hitherto derived from the lectureship or the failure to have his salary placed on a 
more satisfactory footing. He continued to discharge the duties of lecturing to a gradually 
increasing number of students with great ability and success until his death in 1816… it cannot 
be doubted that it is to his ability and zeal in discharging his duties through many 
discouragements that we owe the success of the foundation. 
 
But it is fitting, perhaps, that it is Robert Bell’s own words that should provide the 
epitaph to his contributions – as a law reporter, teacher, writer and practitioner – to Scots 
law. In his brief retrospective, Bell reflected:157 
 
During the whole of this long period, then, my labours have had but one object. In these 
elementary works, and in my Lectures, I have been desirous of assisting the student in 
acquiring a knowledge of his profession – of that profession formerly so little regarded, but at 
all times so important to your Body, and to the public. To the change which, I flatter myself, 
has taken place in the means afforded to the student of following out the study of his 
profession, I shall ever hold it most honourable to have been in any shape instrumental; nor 
shall I regret the time I have spent in the attempt, nor the sacrifices I have made; and, believe 
me, they are greater than you are aware of, or than it can be at all necessary for me to state. 
 
Death and aftermath 
                                                 
154 Two additional examples where George Joseph Bell cited his own work to the court are Bryce v 
Monteith, Bogle & Co 20 Feb 1818 FC, and Brown v Thin 23 Feb 1819 FC. 
155 The last case I have traced in which Robert Bell is reported to have represented one of the parties is 
Laurie v Mags of Edinburgh 6 June 1818 FC. This was a mammoth litigation, spanning several years; 
Robert was just 1 of 7 counsel instructed for the pursuer. 
156 Grant, Writers to Her Majesty’s Signet (n 99) cxvi. 
157 R Bell, A System of the Forms of Deeds used in Scotland, vol 1 (3rd edn, 1811) vii, “Dedication to the 
Society of Writers to His Majesty’s Signet”. 
 xxxv 
Robert died, probably before the age of 60, on 1 November 1816. Immediately following 
his death, the WS Society availed itself of the offer of his brother, George Joseph, to read 
Robert’s lectures until a successor was appointed.158 Just over two weeks later, on 16 
November, Macvey Napier defeated two other candidates, both, curiously, of the name of 
Bell, in the election to succeed Robert.159 But it appears that George Joseph continued 
reading his late brother’s lectures until 1818, the suggestion being that he passed on the 
fees to Robert’s widow.160 It was on conveyancing, therefore, that George Joseph 
obtained his first experience of teaching. 
   
 
The three editors 
 
William Bell 
The next edition of the Dictionary, the third, was prepared for publication by Robert 
Bell’s son, William.161 His early life is shrouded in obscurity, and some later writers do 
not even allow that William was Robert’s son, perhaps because William himself refers 
always to his father as “Mr Bell”. Indeed the only reference to their blood relationship, 
and an indirect one at that, is when William writes in the preface to the 1838 edition that: 
“the truth is, that he [William] has been almost unconsciously involved in the 
undertaking, by his accidental connection with the work in which the present 
originated”.162 It remains unclear when William was born and, if he was baptised, the 
records appear not to have survived. We do know, however, that he passed advocate in 
1824.   
                                                 
158 Ibid cvii. 
159 William Bell WS and John Bell WS: see Grant, Writers to Her Majesty’s Signet (n 99) 432. It seems 
likely that the William Bell was the Writer to the Signet and not Robert’s son, also William, who would be 
admitted to the Faculty of Advocates in 1824. Napier polled 147 votes, Wm Bell 131, and J Bell 31. 
Macvey Napier’s son – also Macvey – gives no indication of any delay in his father commencing lecturing 
and records simply that his father succeeded Robert in 1816: M Napier (ed), Selections from the 
Correspondence of the late Macvey Napier (1877) 9 n. 
160 W M Gordon, “Bell, George Joseph”, Oxford DNB (2004). This is consistent with Letters of Sir Charles 
Bell (n 89) 260 n. 
161 Grant, Faculty of Advocates (n 149) sub nomine “Bell, William” discloses that Robert was William’s 
father. To the same effect is S P Walker and E Walker, The Faculty of Advocates 1800-1986 (1987) 11. 
These sources may be taken to be reliable since the requirement for intrants to the Faculty to name their 
father and his profession continues to this day.   
162 W Bell, A Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland (4th edn, 1838) vol I, vii.  
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William Bell is characterised by one reviewer as having been “a man of extensive 
legal acquirements and of unwearied industry”.163 Much of his early professional life 
appears to have been taken up with carrying on his father’s work: William was 
responsible not only for two editions of the Dictionary, but also for later editions of the 
works on leases164 and conveyancing.165 
It is in its third edition, of 1827, that we have a picture of the Dictionary in 
adolescence. William Bell had begun to experiment on expanding the entries. Proceeding 
from the assumption that his reader was likely to be a practising lawyer, he sought to 
provide the references to authority expected by a professional audience. He described his 
approach thus:166 
 
The Editor undertook some years ago to revise for the press a new edition of this work. His 
intention at first was to have confined himself as nearly as possible to the limits of the former 
edition; but he very soon found that, partly from the original plan of the work not having been 
sufficiently comprehensive, and partly from legislative changes167 within the last few years, 
very considerable corrections and additions were indispensable – that many of the articles of 
the former edition required to be re-written – and that it was necessary to add many new ones.  
With the exception, therefore of most of the articles under the letter A, the editor re-composed 
the whole of the first volume; adding upwards of three hundred new articles under the first 
five letters of the alphabet. 
But the great increase of the size of the book occasioned by these additions, and the 
consequent difficulty of confining himself within the limits of the former work, rendered it 
necessary for the editor to deviate in some degree, in the second volume, from the plan which 
had been adopted in the first. In that volume, accordingly, the terms have been defined more 
concisely; but, at the same time, a very great number of articles entirely new will also be 
found in the second volume. The present edition has been in this way enlarged to double the 
size of the former… 
In the former editions few or no authorities were cited. That defect has now been remedied; 
and, with a few exceptions in the beginning of the first volume, almost every article contains 
                                                 
163 (1861) 5 Journal of Jurisprudence 136.     
164 Bell, Treatise on Leases (n 133). 
165 R Bell, Treatise on the Conveyance of Land (n 134). 
166 R Bell, A Dictionary of the Law of Scotland (3rd edn by W Bell, 1826) vol I, i-ii. 
167 Later in the preface William Bell mentions measures such as the Court of Session Act 1825 (“the new 
Judicature Act”) and the Jury (Scotland) Act 1815. 
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references to the institutional writers, or to other books of authority, or to other articles in 
which the subject is more fully treated. It has also been deemed proper, in this edition, to give 
short definitions of the most ordinary English law terms. These definitions have been abridged 
from the last edition of Sir Thomas Tomlin’s Law Dictionary. 
 
We later learn in the preface to the fourth edition, of 1838, that the reason for the 
piecemeal approach in the third edition was that William Bell’s extended plan of 
arrangement was “incompatible with the views of the Publishers”,168 hence the 
abridgment of the third edition’s second volume. Bell’s experiment, however, convinced 
him that his proposed scheme was justified. The result was a comprehensive revision of 
his father’s dictionary. As he himself stressed, “the present publication is the result; but, 
as it is not, in any sense, a new edition of the former Dictionary, it has not been so 
described in the title page, and it is now offered to the profession on the individual 
responsibility of the Compiler himself”.169 Bell’s major aim was to re-focus the 
Dictionary and Digest – a new title – for the legal profession by way of a general 
expansion of the content and, in particular, the addition of authorities and further 
references. Moreover, it is with the 1838 edition that the addition of a reprint of Skene’s 
De Verborum Significatione – “a cumbersome and expensive appendage” – comes to an 
end. But this deletion is compensated by the fact that, recognising the usefulness of 
Skene’s work, Bell sought to ensure that “all [Skene’s] definitions, as nearly as possible 
in his own words, have been incorporated alphabetically and briefly, in the course of this 
work… with a reference to Skene’s own work for a fuller explanation.”170 Few users of 
Bell’s Dictionary and Digest, perhaps, have realised that it incorporates so much of 
Skene’s work.171 
Bell’s Dictionary, like its later editor, may have been Robert Bell’s child, but the 
Dictionary as we know it today was brought up by William. A later editor, George 
Watson, described William’s advances as follows:172 
 
                                                 
168 W Bell, Dictionary and Digest (n 162) vol I, v. 
169 Ibid v. 
170 Ibid vi. 
171 See e.g. G Watson, Bell’s Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland (7th edn, 1890) sv “Dyvour”. 
172 G Watson, Bell’s Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland (6th edn, 1882) v. 
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Its design is, besides explaining law terms and phrases, to digest and embody in alphabetical 
order, according to the subject matter, all that is practically valuable in the works of the 
Institutional Writers. The law is frequently expressed in the very terms used by these writers 
themselves; and every statement is supported by reference to authority, whether of statutes, or 
of adjudged cases, or of the text writers. 
 
There is at least one modern instance of a high authority – a Lord Chancellor of the 
United Kingdom – preferring William Bell’s 1838 edition over the later editions,173 while 
T B Smith was one of the few legal writers to have traced the 1890 edition back to 
William Bell’s work.174 It was, moreover, Bell’s 1838 edition which was used by the 
compilers of the Oxford English Dictionary, led by the legendary James Murray, as a 
source of Scots law terms: a modern online search shows that it is referred to in the OED 
on some 266 occasions.175   
Few, if any, of Robert Bell’s entries survived his son’s editorship. The Dictionary and 
Digest, as reproduced here, is thus largely the work of William Bell.   
 
George Ross 
Born in 1814, just before the publication of the second edition of the Dictionary, George 
Ross was admitted to the Faculty of Advocates in 1835. According to Lord President 
Inglis’ biographer, Ross was “known as a stiff counsel and a bad pleader, with a profound 
knowledge of case law”.176 Ross held the Chair of Scots Law in the University of 
Edinburgh for a short period between 1861 and his sudden death, from diphtheria, in 
1863.177 In the “hotly-contested” competition for the Chair, Ross beat off considerable 
competition from the likes of Montgomerie Bell.178 Like Robert Bell, Ross is perhaps 
best-known as a law reporter. His three-volume collection of reports, drawing on many 
                                                 
173 Lord Mackay of Clashfern, “The Advocate: should he speak or write?” (1992) 60 Fordham Law Review 
953 at 963 n.   
174 Smith, Judicial Precedent (n 106) 33-4 (“decisions”) and 76 (“ratio decidendi”). 
175 Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edn, online, 1989). 
176 J Crabb Watt, John Inglis, Lord Justice-General of Scotland: A Memoir (1893) 45 n. 
177 Anon, “The Late Professor George Ross” (1863) 7 Journal of Jurisprudence 593. 
178 Ibid; J W Cairns, “Ross, George (1814-1863)”, Oxford DNB (2004). Montgomerie Bell, a partner in 
Dundas & Wilson CS, had held the Chair of Conveyancing at Edinburgh University since 1858. Crabb 
Watt, Inglis (n 176) 277 n lists Hamilton Pyper, George Munro, George Skene, Frederick Hallard, Norman 
Macpherson and Campbell Smith as the other candidates. 
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otherwise difficult-to-obtain manuscript collections of the judges themselves, Leading 
Cases in the Law of Scotland (1851-53), are particularly well-known and often 
invaluable. They were extensively referred to in the House of Lords as recently as 
2004.179 Ross also compiled a series of reports of English as well as Scottish commercial 
cases.180  
Ross’s edition of Bell’s Dictionary – the fifth, published in 1861 – departed 
considerably from the earlier work of Robert and William Bell and appears not to have 
been universally favoured by the profession, his editorship being described as 
“perfunctory and superficial”.181 George Watson, in compiling the next edition, ignored 
Ross’s edition entirely. 
 
George Watson 
It is the seventh and last edition of the Dictionary and Digest that is reproduced here. 
George Watson took over the editorship for the sixth edition of 1882 and the seventh of 
1890, and it was under his charge that the Dictionary and Digest cemented its reputation 
as a work of reference for the practising lawyer.   
Watson was born in 1846, admitted to the Faculty of Advocates in 1871, and called to 
the English bar in 1884 for reasons which were “chiefly ornamental”.182 He was later 
sheriff-substitute at Wigtown.183 As reviewers noted, Watson’s input to the Dictionary 
and Digest was considerable. “A great part of the contents has had indeed to be entirely 
re-written” and “the whole book, indeed, may be looked upon as practically a new 
                                                 
179 Burnett’s Tr v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19: many of the cases to which Lord Rodger refers are taken 
from Ross’s reports. 
180 G Ross, Leading Cases in the Commercial Law of England and Scotland: selected and arranged in 
systematic order, 3 vols (1853-7). 
181 Anon, “Review of A Dictionary of English Law” (1882) 26 Journal of Jurisprudence 370 at 372. 
182 “Notes from Edinburgh” (1900) 16 Scottish Law Review 239. The anonymous writer adds that: “In one 
respect he is a political monstrosity, for he combines Unionism with Disestablishment”. For a photograph 
and brief biographical details, see (1896) 3 SLT (News) 179. 
183 (1891) 35 Journal of Jurisprudence 32. This is noted in Grant, Faculty of Advocates (n 149) 215. The 
notice at (1891) 35 Journal of Jurisprudence 450 indicates that Watson was also appointed sheriff-substitute 
at Newton Stewart, which is where Watson died in 1927. 
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work”.184 The result was an “unrivalled book of reference for the Scots practitioner”185 
the credit for which was due “almost entirely” to Watson:186 
 
the credit… of having made the Dictionary an indispensible weapon in the armoury of the 
professional man; and in this new edition it will be found that the weapon is tempered to the 
highest state of efficiency. Mr Watson has read in a very thorough and appreciative manner all 
the case law since his previous edition of 1882, and the effects of that reading are to be found 
on every page. 
 
Such was Watson’s input that Henry Goudy considered Bell’s Dictionary and Digest, 
under Watson’s editorship, to be in the nature of a “cyclopeadia”,187 while a later scholar, 
Niall Whitty, has remarked that “this useful work was not a mere dictionary but also a 
digest of the branches of Scots law and half-way to becoming an encyclopaedia”.188 
Although, however, the credit for the final form of the Dictionary and Digest goes to 
Watson, it is worth recording that, under Watson’s editorship, special expertise in matters 
of insolvency and commercial law was enlisted from Andrew Mitchell, advocate 
(bankruptcy, insolvency and sequestration) and W D Thorburn, advocate (joint stock 
companies and shipping law). Mitchell’s contributions, in particular, were commended as 
having been treated with “great ability”.189 Importantly, Watson’s approach, mirroring 
William Guthrie’s editing of George Joseph Bell’s Principles,190 was to leave William 
Bell’s text of the 1838 edition largely untouched, with subsequent material distinguished 
by enclosure in square brackets. 
It is Watson who records, in his preface to the sixth edition, that the Dictionary and 
Digest “is said to have been originally projected by Professor George Joseph Bell”, 
although he also acknowledges (without mentioning the fraternity) the orthodox position 
                                                 
184 (1883) 27 Journal of Jurisprudence 27.  
185 J F M’Lennan (1890) 2 JR 180 at 182. 
186 Ibid 181. 
187 H Goudy, “Review of Wharton’s Law-Lexicon” (1889) 1 JR 320 at 321: an allusion, perhaps, to 
Ephraim Chambers’ Cyclopædia or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (1728).   
188 Whitty (n 26) 209. 
189 (1883) 27 Journal of Jurisprudence 27.  
190 Guthrie took over the editorship of Bell’s Principles with the 6th edition in 1872, assisted by David 
Murray. Guthrie alone was responsible for the later editions and his editing was not always reliable: see, for 
instance, T B Smith, “Letter to the Editor” 1986 SLT (News) 275.  
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that the first two editions, of 1807 and 1815, were “compiled by Mr Robert Bell WS”. 
Watson’s reference to George Joseph Bell has given rise to the an unfortunate 
misapprehension that the “Bell” behind the Dictionary and Digest was the institutional 
writer rather than Robert and William: even the Annotated Rules of the Court of Session – 
that handy, if unsystematic, single-volume guide to Scots law for advocates – manages, 
mistakenly, to give for George Joseph Bell’s Commentaries the publication details of 
Watson’s final edition of the Dictionary and Digest.191 But nowhere else has further trace 
of this tantalising link with Scotland’s most modern institutional writer been found. 
 
 
After Bell’s Dictionary 
 
Law dictionaries and judicial dictionaries  
The nineteenth century saw a number of other law dictionaries,192 although only one, 
John Trayner’s Latin Maxims and Phrases,193 made a lasting impression. Trayner’s work 
was not entirely well-received on its first appearance,194 with one reviewer expressly 
avowing a preference for Bell’s Dictionary and Barclay’s Digest.195 But Trayner’s 
Maxims and Phrases, and perhaps also its readers, matured with its author. Its reputation 
is now considerable and not only within Scotland: one South African lawyer has 
criticised a South African legal dictionary for its failure to refer to Trayner’s “superb” 
                                                 
191 N Morrison et al (eds), Green’s Annotated Rules of the Court of Session 2011-2012 reprinted from the 
Parliament House Book (2011) ix. First published in 1980, this work had, for the 2011 reprint, gone 
through 112 releases (to April 2011). It cites the entry in Bell’s Dictionary on “Issues” (for a jury) at paras 
22.3.10, 37.1.5, and 37.1.8. These entries can be attributed to William Bell: see the preface to the 1826 and 
1838 editions.  
192 W Forsyth, The Entire Body of the Statute Law of Scotland ... in the form of a dictionary; with an 
appendix, 2 vols (1839); J Paterson, A Compendium of English and Scotch law stating their differences: 
with a dictionary of parallel terms and phrases (2nd edn, 1865). 
193 But in the 1st edition, the words came the other way round: see J Trayner, Latin Phrases and Maxims: 
collected from the institutional and other writers on Scotch law with translations and illustrations (1861).  
194 Anon (1862) 6 Journal of Jurisprudence 31-2: “there are merits in Mr Trayner’s book… but its defects 
are so numerous, both in regard to execution and conception, that we cannot consent to deal with it on the 
footing of a work written during intervals of leisure, by a very young member of the bar.” 
195 Ibid 33. The reference to Barclay’s Digest is to H Barclay, A Digest of the Law of Scotland, with special 
reference to the office and duties of a justice of the peace (1853) which records (vii) that “the plan adopted 
is that of a Dictionary…”. 
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book.196 No one, in Scotland at least, has sought to supersede Trayner’s work,197 a point 
highlighted by the fact that the fourth and last edition, of 1894, was reprinted in 1986 and 
again in 1993.198   
Later works have sought to distinguish a law dictionary from a judicial dictionary. The 
twentieth century has seen a number of judicial dictionaries, such as A W Dalrymple and 
A D Gibb’s Dictionary of Words and Phrases judicially defined and commented on by 
the Scottish Supreme Courts (1946) and W J Stewart’s Scottish Contemporary Judicial 
Dictionary (1995). Remarkably, however, each of them assiduously points out that it is 
not attempting to compete with, far less supersede, Bell’s Dictionary and Digest:199   
 
This is not a Scottish legal dictionary: it is not a rival of the excellent Bell. A legal dictionary 
aims at an explanation or definition of the voces signatae of the law and should be exhaustive 
of them. All technical terms should find a place in it. This work, however, belongs to the class 
of judicial dictionaries. It does not purport to include anything but the judges’ explanations or 
definitions of the words which have happened to come under their notice. Further, it is to a 
very large extent concerned with lay words and expressions. 
 
Unlike the law dictionary, “the judicial dictionary is aimed at the legal practitioner who 
wants to know what use has been made of ordinary legal words in various contexts”.200  
But if that is its modest aim, it must face considerable competition from the case digests, 
such as Shaw’s Digest or The Scots Digest or the Faculty Digests, in which there will be 
found sections dedicated to “words judicially defined”. Perhaps the only work of similar 
ambition to Bell’s Dictionary and Digest is Professor D M Walker’s Oxford Companion 
to Law. But even Walker’s classic volume does not replace Bell’s Dictionary and Digest, 
for the Oxford Companion is, as Lord Rodger has said of it, a “mini-encyclopaedia of 
                                                 
196 J D van der Vyver, “Review of V G Heemstra and H L Gonin, Dreitalige Regswoordeboek” (1982) 99 
SALJ 160 at 165. 
197 T J D Connelly and J C Brown, Select Scots Law Maxims (1934), largely a précis of Trayner, was 
published to remedy the difficulty students encountered in obtaining copies of the Trayner, then out of 
print. 
198 This was the 4th edition of 1894. 
199 A W Dalrymple and A D Gibb, Dictionary of Words and Phrases judicially defined and commented on 
by the Scottish Supreme Courts (1946), preface. The genesis of this work is curious: each author had 
separately submitted overlapping proposals to the same publisher, which suggested the two authors 
collaborate. See too W J Stewart, Scottish Contemporary Judicial Dictionary (1995), preface. 
200 Stewart, Scottish Contemporary Judicial Dictionary xciii.  
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law, dealing not merely with English law, but Scots, Roman, Irish, American, German, 
French, Swiss, South African and many other systems besides”.201  
 
Encyclopaedias 
One of the reasons that Bell’s Dictionary and Digest did not progress beyond 1890 is 
because it was, to some extent, overtaken: the first edition of Green’s Encyclopaedia of 
the Law of Scotland appeared in 1896 with a second edition in 1909. It may be, indeed, 
that the 1896 edition of Green’s Encyclopaedia, given its style and titles, was no more 
than a new version of Bell’s Dictionary and Digest by a different publisher.202 The 
Green’s Encyclopaedias were themselves replaced by the Encyclopaedia of the Laws of 
Scotland which began to appear in 1926, to be replaced in turn from 1987 onwards by the 
multi-volume standard reference work, The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia. It may again be observed that all of these important repositories of Scots 
law follow, for practical reasons, the alphabetical rather than the institutional order. Their 
story has been told elsewhere.203   
 
 
Anglo-American law dictionaries 
 
Early English dictionaries 
A history of Anglo-American legal dictionaries needs a PhD of its own. Suffice to say, 
however, that it is of considerable interest that dictionaries of English law terms precede 
dictionaries of the English language,204 and that the earliest English legal dictionaries are 
                                                 
201 A F Rodger, “Good companion?” (1981) 1 OJLS 257.  For my own appraisal of the Oxford Companion, 
see (2009) 13 Edin LR 340. 
202 I am grateful to George Gretton for this insight.   
203 Whitty (n 26). 
204 J Rastell, Expositiones Terminorum Legum Anglorum (1527) later published under the title Termes de la 
Ley: or, Certaine difficult and obscure Words and Termes of the Common Lawes of this Realme expounded 
(1641), compiled by John Rastell with the help of his son, William: see H J Graham, “The Rastells and the 
printed English law books of the Renaissance” (1954) 47 Law Library Journal 6; T Blount, A world of 
errors discovered in the New world of words, or general English dictionary; and in Nomothetes, or the 
interpreter of law-words and terms (1673); T Blount, Nomo-lexikon = A law-dictionary; interpreting such 
difficult and obscure words and terms, as are found either in our common or statute, ancient or modern 
lawes (2nd edn, 1670); T Blount, Glossographia, or, A dictionary interpreting the hard words of 
whatsoever language now used in our refined English tongue (1670). 
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of Law-French205 or Latin as well as of English legal terms.  At the end of the nineteenth 
century, one American writer counted the law dictionaries, concluding that, “since 1607, 
there have been published in England at least twenty-nine, and in America, thirteen; 
twenty-one since 1839.”206 Most, however, were little to his liking.   
Of the Anglo-American law dictionaries, however, all have been eclipsed by one: 
Black’s Law Dictionary (about which more later). The position of the law dictionary in 
the USA is special because of the love affair that US courts appear to have with 
dictionaries. For whereas, in Europe, a legal dictionary is normally something used by 
law students, in the USA many questions of law referred to the justices of the Supreme 
Court result in an earnest sifting of the law dictionaries. Only in the courts of the USA, it 
seems, does one encounter the “dictionary shopping” phenomenon.207 The phenomenon, 
perhaps, is related to the death of doctrinal legal scholarship in the USA. Where a 
German lawyer looking for further references on a particular question may leaf through 
an entire Habilitationsschrift on the subject, the US Supreme Court justice, it seems, may 
be quite satisfied with a law dictionary entry.   
 
The Anglophone benchmark: Black’s Law Dictionary 
A considerable body of literature has grown up around law dictionaries in the English-
speaking world, largely, although not entirely, as a result of the success of Black’s Law 
Dictionary under the editorship of Bryan Garner.208 Black’s Dictionary is an interesting 
comparison for Bell’s Dictionary and Digest. Black’s, first published by Henry Campbell 
Black in 1891, one year after the last edition of Bell’s Dictionary, has now endured for a 
similar period.  From the outset, Black’s attempted to cover Scots law – and Black 
expressly acknowledged his use of Bell’s Dictionary, along with works by John Erskine 
                                                 
205 Anon, The Law-French Dictionary alphabetically digested; very useful for all young students in the 
common laws of England (2nd edn, 1718); Anon, The Law-Latin Dictionary; being an alphabetical 
collection of such law-Latin words as are found in several authentic manuscripts and printed books of 
precedents (2nd edn, 1718). For a discussion, see J H Baker, Manual of Law French (2nd edn, 1990). 
206 W C Anderson, “Law dictionaries” (1894) 28 American Law Review 531. 
207 See S A Thumma and J L Kirchmeier, “Lexicon has become a fortress: The United States Supreme 
Court’s use of dictionaries” (1999) 47 Buffalo Law Review 227; idem, “The lexicon remains a fortress: an 
update” (2001) 5 Green Bag (2d) 51; idem, “Scaling the lexicon fortress: the United States Supreme 
Court’s use of dictionaries in the twenty-first century” (2010) 94 Marqette Law Review 77. 
208 B Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edn, 2009), for which see L J Taylor, “The evolution of 
Black’s Law Dictionary” (2011) 36 Canadian Law Library Review 106; S Yates, “Black’s Law Dictionary: 
the making of an American standard” (2011) 103 Law Library Journal 175. 
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and George Joseph Bell, for Scots law.209 The edition founded upon by Black, however, 
though attributed to William Bell, was the little-used fifth edition by George Ross.210  
Since Black’s rejuvenation under Garner’s editorship, it has recognised the importance 
of Roman law principles which “under-lie many modern civil and common law 
concepts”. As Garner himself explains, however, as an American lawyer, he did not 
himself feel competent to review the Roman law entries: 211 
 
So I went straight to the top of the field. I hired Professor Tony Honoré of Oxford and 
Professor David Walker of Glasgow to review every entry in the book. Not only did they 
correct a lot of the Roman law material – from misrecorded Latin headwords to incomplete 
and inaccurate definitions; they also improved treatment of English law and Scots law. There 
isn’t a single page of Black’s Seventh that wasn’t improved by their erudition and industry.  
 
Walker, Regius Professor Emeritus of Civil Law at Glasgow, is, says Garner, “perhaps 
the most prolific legal writer in the British Isles and the author of the renowned Oxford 
Companion to Law.”212 Not only does Black’s thus have important Scottish input – on 
both Roman law and Scots law Olivia Robinson and Ernst Metzger were enlisted for the 
eighth edition in 2004 – but editor-in-chief Garner, at Walker’s invitation, spent part of 
the summer of 1996 doing research in Glasgow for the first edition to appear under 
Garner’s editorship: Black’s Seventh.213 The result, as Garner ironically observed, is that 
the foremost American law dictionary, at the end of the twentieth century, was better in 
covering Scots law than the law of Louisiana.214   
 
Lessons from Germany? 
                                                 
209 H C Black, A Dictionary of Law containing definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and 
English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern (1891) iv. No UK library appears to hold a copy of the 1st 
edition of Black’s, although the University of Aberdeen has a 2nd edition. The 2nd edition is now easily 
accessible in the Legal Classics Library of HeinOnline.   
210 Ibid vii (“Bibliographical List of the Principal Law Dictionaries in English and Foreign Languages”). 
Peter Halkerston’s Collection of Latin Maxims (1823) is included (viii) as is Skene’s De Verborum 
Significatione (ix) and the second edition of Trayner’s Latin Maxims (1876) (x). 
211 B Garner, “Legal lexicography: a view from the front lines” (2003) 6 Green Bag (2d) 151 at 157. 
Walker, then retired from the Regius Chair, would no longer have been involved in ordering books for the 
Glasgow University Library which, perhaps for this reason, does not hold the 7th edition of Black’s.    
212 B Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edn, 2009) xx (preface to 7th edn). 
213 Ibid.  
214 Garner (n 211) 158. 
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The Germans are, in this area as in others, better served than most.215 There are 
essentially three types of German legal dictionary. There is the historical language 
dictionary, of which the best example is the Deutsches Rechtswörterbuch, spanning a 
century in the writing and not yet finished: despite its title, it is not limited to German 
law.216 In a similar vein, Heumann’s classic Handlexikon is the first port of call for 
tracing Latin words in the Corpus Iuris Civilis.217 The second type of dictionary is the 
law dictionary in the Anglophone sense: the dictionary of legal words and concepts likely 
to be used by law students. The standard example is the Deutsches Rechts-Lexikon.218 
Finally, there is the legal encyclopaedia. The peerless Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen 
Rechtsgeschichte (HRG), for example, now in its second edition,219 is the standard 
international reference work for legal history, while the Handwörterbuch des 
Europäischen Privatrechts, recently made available in English as the Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of European Private Law, is the standard reference work for European 
Private Law.220 All bear the indelible intellectual rigour of German legal scholarship. 
 
 
The later reputation of Bell’s Dictionary and Digest 
 
In Scotland 
As a repository of language, Bell’s Dictionary and Digest has received that basic 
accolade of being occasionally cited by the Oxford English Dictionary as a source in 
which obscure words are used.221 But the primary focus here is on the Dictionary’s 
reputation among lawyers and judges. One of its perceived advantages is that judges have 
                                                 
215 Cf O Gönnenwein, “Geschichte des juristischen Vokabulars: Geschichte und vergleichende 
Untersuchung der Rechtssprache, Festlegung von Methoden”, in E Wolff (ed), Beiträge zur 
Rechtsforschung (1950) 36. 
216 Deutsches Rechtswörterbuch: Wörterbuch der älteren deutschen Rechtssprache (1914- , available at 
http://drw-www.adw.uni-heidelberg.de/drw/). A useful French-language resource of mediaeval legal terms 
is J Balon (ed), Grand dictionnaire de droit du moyen âge, 9 vols (1972-4). 
217 H G Heumann, Handlexikon zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts (10th edn by E Seckel, 1958). 
218 H Tilch and A Arloth (eds), Deutsches Rechts-Lexikon, 3 vols (3rd edn, 2001, with supplement, 2003). 
219 W Erler and E Kaufmann (eds), Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 5 vols (1964-98); 
2nd edn, vol 1 (2008).    
220 J Basedow, K J Hopt, R Zimmermann, and A Stier (eds), Max Planck Encyclopedia of European 
Private Law (2012). 
221 See n 174 above. 
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felt able to rely on it for a statement of practice. 222  Even in 1910, however, when the last 
edition of the Dictionary and Digest was only 20 years’ old, the editor of the Juridical 
Review, although admitting its “great and abiding” authority, thought a reference to the 
Dictionary alone on a point to be somewhat “quaint”.223   
Quaint or not, however, practitioners make use of Bell’s Dictionary whenever they 
consider it may assist their case. Even today, it is frequently, if not regularly, referred to, 
particularly in appeals: the majority of recent references to the Dictionary are in 
argument before the Inner House224 although there are also examples of it being referred 
to in the Outer House225 and in the sheriff court.226 On occasion it is the court which 
introduces the reference: this is generally in private law cases and the examples tend to 
involve words which are in the nature of jargon227 or subjects of an antiquarian nature 
(such as the nature of a “barony”228 or the meaning of “desuetude”229). The utility of the 
Dictionary is not, however, limited to abstruse points: one well-known South African 
counsel turned to the sixth edition of the Dictionary when assisting the House of Lords in 
                                                 
222 Aberdein v Stratton’s Trs (1867) 39 Sc Jur 362 at 365 per Lord Justice Clerk Patton citing Ross’s 
edition of the Dictionary, together with Robert Bell’s work on Deeds, as the place where “we see the 
practice stated”.  
223 (1910-11) 22 JR 355. 
224 Emms Ptr 2011 SC 433 at para 21 (“procurator fiscal”); Sovereign Dimensional Survey Ltd v Cooper 
2009 SC 382 at para 27 (“commission and diligence”); Peart v Legge 2008 SC 93 at para 15 (“res merae 
facultatis”); Sommerville v Scottish Ministers 2007 SC 140 at para 94 (“mora”) (the Session Cases reporter 
mistakenly attributes the 1890 edition to Robert Bell); Little Cumbrae Estate Ltd v Island of Little Cumbrae 
Ltd 2007 SC 525 at para 14 (“damnum fatale”) (the Session Cases reporter mistakenly attributes the 
Dictionary and Digest to George Joseph Bell); William Grant & Sons Limited v Glen Catrine Bonded 
Warehouse Limited 2001 SC 901 at para 29 (“personal bar”); Clark v Lindale Homes Ltd 1994 SC 210 at 
216 (“warrandice”). 
225 Melfort Pier Holidays Ltd v The Melfort Club 2007 SC 243 at para 15 (“road, public”); Royal and Sun 
Alliance Insurance plc v Wyman-Gordon Ltd 2001 SLT 1305 at para 13 (“bounding charter”); Smithy’s 
Place Ltd v Blackadder & McMonagle 1991 SLT 791 at 793 (“distress”); Lord Advocate v Shipbreaking 
Industries Ltd 1991 SLT 838 at 840. 
226 Peart v Legge 2007 SCLR 86 at para 8 (rev 2008 SC 93) (“res merae facultatis”); Stanley Howard 
(Construction) Ltd v Davis 1988 SLT (Sh Ct) 30 (“in limine”). 
227 Somerville v Scottish Ministers 2007 SC 140 (“mora”); William Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine 
Bonded Warehouse Ltd 2001 SC 901 (“personal bar”, although Lord Rodger preferred to go to Bell’s 
Principles to explain rei interventus); Grosvenor Developments (Scotland) plc v Argyll Stores Ltd 1987 
SLT 738 at 742 (“interdict”). 
228 Spencer-Thomas of Buquhollie v Newell 1992 SLT 973 at 974. The entry for “barony” has been cited 
also to the House of Lords in an English appeal: The Berkley Peerage Case (1861) 11 ER 333 at 352. 
229 McSkimming v Royal Bank of Scotland plc 1997 SLT 515 at 517, in the context of the Breach of 
Arrestment Act 1581. That entry is also much cited in US academic writing.  M P Henriques, “Desuetude 
and declaratory judgment: a new challenge to obsolete laws” (1990) 76 Virginia Law Review 1057 at 1069 
is just one example. 
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an English appeal on an important point of intellectual property law,230 while the 
definition of “interest” has been approved in the House of Lords in an English tax 
appeal.231 
 
Elsewhere 
The Dictionary and Digest has been much cited by foreign lawyers. To some extent it 
provides, in a single volume, a Rough Guide to the entire law of Scotland: in no other 
book, indeed, one contemporary reviewer of the 1882 edition observed, “have we an 
epitome of the Law of Scotland at once so complete and so handy”.232 For the lawyer, at 
least, the Dictionary can be more user-friendly than, say, a single-volume introduction to 
the whole law, such as Gloag and Henderson’s Introduction to the Law of Scotland,233 
since the reader needs to bring to the former only knowledge of the alphabet and a query 
about a particular term.  
Many foreign lawyers, therefore, have reached for Bell’s Dictionary when looking for 
a Scottish view: it has been referred to in England,234 South Africa,235 Canada236 and the 
United States,237 including the US Supreme Court.238 Typical instances are in matters of 
                                                 
230 Sydney Kentridge QC: see CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] AC 1013 at 
1044. It is not clear to which entry counsel was actually referring. 
231 Riches v Westminster Bank Limited [1947] AC 390 at 413. The Court of Session has also approved: Lees 
Trustees v Inland Revenue Commissioners 1916 SC 188. 
232 Anon (1883) 27 Journal of Jurisprudence 27. 
233 W M Gloag and R C Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland (1927), a single volume whose 
life-span to date (85 years) rather mirrors Bell’s Dictionary and Digest (also 85 years). The most recent 
edition is H L MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), The Law of Scotland (13th edn, 2012). 
234 See, for example, Dutton v Hally (1862) 2 Best and Smith 748, 121 ER 1249 at 1252, arguendo 
(“meditatio fugae”); G Williams, “Partial performance of entire contracts I” (1941) 57 LQR 373 at 392 n 
97; Racecourse Betting Control Board v Secretary for Air [1944] Ch 114 at 123 (“arbitration”); Inland 
Revenue Commissioners v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd [1963] AC 135 at 139, arguendo 
(“excambion”). 
235 The following articles refer to the entry on “vesting”: Anon, “Vesting of an interest not yet 
ascertainable” (1911) 28 SALJ 452 at 453; Anon, “Notes on some controverted points of law” (1919) 36 
SALJ 35.  
236 Hus v Charland (1884) 12 Revue Légale 608 at 609 (“protection against personal diligence”). It is not 
clear which edition the Cour supérieure de Montreal was using, but the passage quoted is found in the 6th 
edition of 1882. I Wotherspoon, “Constitutionality of acts of the local legislature in matters of insolvency” 
(1871) 1 Revue Critique de Legislation et de Jurisprudence du Canada 117 at 119 cites Bell’s Dictionary in 
the same breath as the Coutume de Paris.  
237 E S Mack, “Bankruptcy legislation” (1894) 28 American Law Review 1 at 2 n (“dyvour”, in comparison 
to the French position). See too R W Millar, “Civil pleading in Scotland” (1932) 30 Michigan Law Review 
545 at 556. 
238 Keck v United States 172 US 434 at 461 (1899) (“smuggling”); Joseph Burstyn Inc v Wilson 343 US 495 
at 539 (1952) (“blasphemy” and “sacrilege”). 
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insolvency, debt and diligence, and Scots law is often juxtaposed with French law.239 
Perhaps because of the deep civilian influence on Scots law, its terminology appears to 
the common lawyer so “delightfully abstruse” as to have him reaching for Bell’s 
Dictionary.240 The utility of the Dictionary resulted in its final edition attaining the 
apotheosis of the benchmark. So not only have foreign law dictionaries been criticised in 
Scotland for attempting to define Scots law terms without reference to Bell’s 
Dictionary,241 such dictionaries have been found wanting, even as dictionaries of a 
foreign system, against Bell’s benchmark.242   
 
Modern relevance 
The seventh edition of Bell’s Dictionary and Digest, reproduced here, is not a dictionary 
of the modern law. The point is worth emphasising. The entries contained in this book 
are, potentially, more than 120 years out of date. Some will no longer represent the law at 
all. But, as one English judge has perceptively reminded us, “the truly insightful textbook 
remains valuable for years without update”243 and the value of Bell’s Dictionary is that, 
despite the passing centuries, it remains “full of still valuable information”.244 It is still 
included in the list of standard works that any UK library purporting to hold Scottish 
legal material should have: it is, indeed, a “key material”.245 
Of course, some entries represent the law as accurately as they did in 1890; others, 
however, are now only partly accurate. So Bell’s Dictionary will prove most useful to 
those who know, at least, what they don’t know; the reader who has not yet reached that 
level of intellectual enlightenment ought, probably, to start somewhere else. Bell’s 
Dictionary and Digest will continue to be a useful tool for the interested reader intent on 
                                                 
239 See the examples in nn 236 and 237 above, as well as Anon, “The presumption of life” (1891) 35 
Journal of Jurisprudence 634 at 636; T K Nuttal, “A question of legitimacy” (1897) 22 Law Magazine and 
Law Review (5th Ser) 171 at 174 (“legitimation”); N Wilson, “The Scottish bar: the evolution of the 
Faculty of Advocates in its historical social setting” (1968) 28 Louisiana Law Review 235 at 241 n. 
240 M Radin, “Guarantee and suretyship” (1929) 17 California Law Review 605 at 617. 
241 H Goudy, “Review of Wharton’s Law-Lexicon, 9th edn” (1892) 4 JR 369. 
242 Ibid. 
243 G Vos, “The centenary of the publication of The Laws of England by Lord Halsbury”, in S Hetherington 
(ed), Halsbury’s Laws of England, Centenary Essays (2007).  
244 D M Walker, The Scottish Jurists (1985) 385. 
245 “A library for the modern law school: a statement of standards for university library provision in the UK 
– 2009 revision prepared by the libraries sub-committee of the Society of Legal Scholars” (2010) 30 Legal 
Studies 442 at 469. 
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interrogating Scotland’s rich, and often untilled, primary legal sources from the 
nineteenth century and earlier which, for lawyers, are not just historical records but 
repositories of the present law. For the law student, trying to master the basic vocabulary 
of a subject darkened by impenetrable legal jargon, the Dictionary and Digest will often 
illuminate the way. For the practising lawyer, working under the pressure of people, 
circumstance, time and money, finding answers can be a lonely and frustrating 
experience. Help is always welcome. And this book offers more help than many.   
 
Ross Gilbert Anderson 
University of Glasgow* 
                                                 
* I thank George Gretton, Hector MacQueen and, above all, Kenneth Reid for various suggestions. 
